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ABSTRACT 
 
 Decision-making has become the focus of increased scientific attention in recent 
years. Attempts to characterize decision-making deficits in unipolar mood and anxiety 
disorders have, however, produced conflicting results. The current study examined two 
types of impairment, indecisiveness and risky decision-making, in a clinical sample of 
individuals with depression and/or anxiety. Depression and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) symptoms were hypothesized to predict both self-reported indecisiveness 
and decision latency on behavioral tasks, with processing speed partially mediating the 
relationship between psychopathology and decision latency. It was hypothesized that 
symptoms of OCD and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) would predict advantageous 
performance on a task assessing risky decision-making, and that executive functioning 
would partially mediate the relationship between psychopathology and risky decision-
making.  
 A sample of individuals (N = 74) who had recently undergone semi-structured 
diagnostic interviews was recruited for the current study. All participants were diagnosed 
with at least one unipolar mood or anxiety disorder, with the majority meeting criteria for 
two or more disorders. All participants completed the same study protocol, which 
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included self-report measures, neuropsychological tests, and computer-administered 
decision-making tasks. Regression analyses and latent growth modeling were used to 
examine associations between psychopathology, decision-making, and 
neuropsychological variables.  
 Self-reported depressive symptoms and OCD symptoms predicted self-reported 
indecisiveness. Contrary to prediction, psychopathology (when measured dimensionally 
via self-report measures or operationalized as the presence or absence of a depressive 
disorder, GAD, or OCD) did not predict decision latency, and there was no evidence of a 
mediating effect of processing speed. Self-reported depressive symptoms, but not self-
reported symptoms of GAD or OCD, were positively associated with ratings of decision 
difficulty. On a measure of risky decision-making, a diagnosis of GAD and poorer set-
shifting were both associated with less improvement in performance over the course of 
the task, whereas a diagnosis of OCD was associated with more improvement.  
 Results are discussed in the context of the decision-making literature. 
Methodological challenges to the study of decision-making are addressed and ideas for 
future research are proposed.  
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Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, decision-making has become the focus of increased 
scientific attention, with researchers in a variety of fields attempting to characterize how 
individuals make decisions (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Frost 
& Shows, 1993; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Murphy et al., 2001; Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Theories of decision-making that emphasize the role 
of emotion have supplanted traditional “rational choice” paradigms, and dysfunctions in 
decision-making processes have been identified in multiple forms of psychopathology 
(Paulus, 2007; Rahman, Sahakian, Cardinal, Rogers, & Robbins, 2001). Much of the 
research on decision-making impairment has focused on neurologic or psychiatric 
disorders characterized by marked impulsivity, with less attention paid to decision-
making in individuals with unipolar mood and anxiety disorders. 
The aims of this study were to characterize decision-making deficits associated 
with anxiety and mood disorders, determine if particular disorders uniquely predict 
decision-making dysfunction, and examine the relationship between these deficits and 
cognitive functioning.  
Overview of Decision Science 
 The dearth of literature on decision-making impairment in unipolar depression 
and anxiety disorders may be due, in part, to the absence of a standard definition of 
decision-making itself. In colloquial use, the term is often used interchangeably with 
judgment and choice. Traditionally, researchers have used the term judgment to describe 
the evaluation of options and decision-making to refer to the selection of a course of 
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action (Hastie, 2001). Others, however, define decision-making broadly to include the 
appraisal of available options, execution of a choice, and evaluation of the outcome 
(Paulus, Feinstein, Simmons, & Stein, 2004). The term has been used to describe 
everything from simple sensory discriminations (Heekeren, Marrett, & Ungerleider, 
2008) to complex evaluations of social justice and economic self-interest (Rilling & 
Sanfey, 2011). 
Measuring decision-making. Not surprisingly, tasks designed to assess decision-
making vary widely across studies, reflecting the imprecision of the term and the 
fragmented nature of the decision-making literature. Researchers representing numerous 
fields—including anthropology, economics, neuroscience, and psychiatry—have 
contributed to the literature on decision-making, leading to the development of myriad 
decision-making tasks, some of which bear little resemblance to one another (e.g., Lejuez 
et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003). Currently, the most widely used and standardized tasks 
to assess decision-making in the context of psychopathology are computer-administered 
simulations of gambling decisions (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; 
Rogers et al., 1999). Other approaches have included the use of “information boards” on 
which experimenters display a matrix describing attributes of each option (Ferrari & 
Dovidio, 2001); a task requiring respondents to choose a hypothetical romantic partner 
after reading a series of vignettes (Forgas, 1991); and a battery of tasks assessing 
individuals’ application of traditional decision rules (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & 
Fischhoff, 2007). Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to evaluate the convergent 
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or external validity of laboratory decision-making tasks (Bishara et al., 2009; 
Monterosso, Ehrman, Napier, & O'Brien, 2001).  
As the definition and measurement of decision-making have evolved, so has 
researchers’ definition of competent decision-making. Traditional theories of decision-
making were based on economic models and assumed that the “ideal” decision maker’s 
thought processes were free of biases and heuristics (Edwards, 1961). These early 
theories of decision-making may be classified as descriptive or prescriptive, either 
describing normative decision processes or providing a set of rules for combining 
probabilities and utilities for selecting an option (Pitz & Sachs, 1984). “Good” decisions 
were those that demonstrated internal coherence and logical consistency within a system 
of beliefs. These rational choice paradigms, which typically assumed the existence of a 
correct response to a decision task (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998), remain 
influential (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), most notably in 
the assessment of decision-making capacity in cognitively impaired elderly adults (e.g., 
Kim, Karlawish, & Caine, 2002).  
More recent theories, however, have acknowledged that an error in a traditional 
decision-making task may constitute an adaptive decision in another setting, and that 
decision makers are influenced by factors other than the expected utility of a decision 
(Mellers et al., 1998). Researchers have demonstrated that normal decision-making is 
characterized by significant, and often predictable, departures from rationality (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974) and that environmental variables may significantly affect the choices 
people make (Payne, 1982).  
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The role of emotion in decision-making was not systematically studied until the 
1980s and 90s, when investigators began to consider the influence of pre- and post-
decision affect on decision-making (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994; Isen & Means, 1983). 
In the mid-1990s and 2000s, the study of decision-making became the domain of 
affective neuroscience, with researchers considering the effect of focal brain lesions on 
decision-making (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006). 
The burgeoning field of decision science now includes the study of various patient groups 
and attempts to link clinical syndromes to performance on laboratory tasks of decision-
making. 
Decision-Making’s Relevance to Psychopathology 
Clinicians and researchers have long recognized that individuals with certain 
neurologic conditions may exhibit impaired real-life decision-making (e.g., Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Fellows, 2006). Increasingly, researchers have 
attempted to apply laboratory findings from neurologic samples to individuals with 
mental disorders, and to elucidate how psychopathology may lead to disadvantageous 
decision-making. Although the clinical signs and symptoms of emotional disorders are 
substantially different from those of frontal lobe damage, certain features of anxiety and 
unipolar depression suggest that these disorders may be associated with decision-making 
deficits. Depressed individuals, for example, exhibit decreased responsiveness to reward 
(Eshel & Roiser, 2010), which may lead to a reduction in adaptive, approach-related 
behaviors. Furthermore, schemas associated with depression include beliefs about one’s 
helplessness and incompetence, as well excessively high standards for personal 
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performance and excessive attention to detail (Young, Weinberger, & Beck, 2001). 
Characterized by exaggerated perceptions of risk (Butler & Mathews, 1987), fear of 
making mistakes (Antony, Purdon, Huta, & Swinson, 1998), and excessive doubting 
(Aardema & O'Connor, 2012; Bechara et al., 2001), anxiety may result in inaction or a 
pathological degree of risk aversion. Both anxiety and unipolar depression involve altered 
perceptions of risk or reward and biases that may lead to distress during decision-making, 
as well as prolonged decision times. As such, the current study focuses on two types of 
decision-making pathology, decision-making under risk and indecisiveness. 
Decision-making under risk. In an attempt to explain the real-life decision-
making impairments of patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM), 
Damasio (1994) proposed the somatic marker hypothesis. According to this theory, 
emotions are not merely the byproduct of decisions; rather, they provide information with 
which people make decisions. Emotions, represented as somatic states, or the body’s 
“internal milieu” (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; p. 295), operate as alarms or 
incentive signals when individuals make decisions. The VM is thought to provide the 
substrate for learning associations between particular situations and emotional states. 
Impulsive behavior observed in patients with damage to the VM is believed to result from 
disruption in the normal processing of emotional signals. Unlike healthy control 
participants, patients with damage to the VM fail to respond to nonconscious, somatic 
signals that are suggestive of environmental threat or risk (Bechara et al., 1997).  
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) was developed to test some 
of the central tenets of the somatic marker hypothesis in patients with neurologic and 
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psychiatric disorders. Designed to simulate real-life decisions in the context of 
uncertainty and risk, the IGT is a computer-administered task during which participants 
are instructed to make money by drawing cards from one of four decks, with each card 
conferring an immediate reward or penalty. Two of the decks contain high-reward/high-
punishment cards and two decks contain low-reward/low-punishment cards. Participants 
are not informed of the length of the game or the frequency with which they will incur 
losses. Bechara et al. (1997) have demonstrated that control participants, presumably 
anticipating the potential consequences of their choice, experience a marked galvanic 
skin response prior to drawing from a high-risk deck, though patients with VM damage 
do not. Control participants typically choose fewer high-risk cards and incur fewer large 
losses than patients, whose impaired performance purportedly results from their inability 
to consider the future consequences of their decisions when faced with the possibility of 
immediate reward. The somatic marker hypothesis has proven helpful in explaining the 
impulsive decision-making observed in patients with frontal lobe damage, but its 
suitability to the study of unipolar mood and anxiety disorders remains unclear (Dunn et 
al., 2006). The IGT has inspired the development of other computer-administered 
measures of risky decision making. Unlike the IGT, the Rogers Decision-Making Task 
(1999) offers respondents unambiguous information about the risk and reward associated 
with each choice, rather than requiring them to learn these contingencies through trial and 
error. The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) requires participants to inflate a 
simulated balloon; each “pump” causes the balloon to grow and results in the accrual of 
“money” until, at a predetermined point, risk-taking becomes disadvantageous, the 
 7  
 
balloon explodes, and the participant loses all of his or her earnings. Although both the 
Rogers task and the BART purport to correct weaknesses in the IGT (addressed further in 
the Discussion), the IGT remains the most widely used laboratory task of decision-
making. 
Indecisiveness. Despite receiving relatively little attention in the empirical 
literature, indecisiveness has been implicated in several anxiety and mood disorders. 
Since the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM; APA, 1980), indecisiveness or “difficulty making decisions” has been included in 
the diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD) and dysthymic disorder. 
Although not part of the formal definition of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 
indecisiveness has long been considered a feature of the disorder (Milner et al., 1971; 
Reed, 1976). Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence of an association between 
emotional disorders and indecisiveness. Twenty years after Frost and Shows (1993) noted 
that “almost all the work on indecisiveness has been theoretical or descriptive” (p. 683), 
the literature on indecisiveness and its relationship to psychopathology remains limited.  
Frost and Shows (1993) have characterized indecisiveness as a multidimensional 
construct consisting of uncertainty about preferences, difficulty organizing one’s actions, 
decision postponement, and pre- and post-decision anxiety. Their use of the term 
“compulsive indecisiveness” suggests a relationship between indecisiveness and OCD, 
but they offer little speculation about the construct’s relationship to psychopathology 
(i.e., is it an associated feature of OCD or a trait that waxes and wanes in the presence of 
psychopathology?). Within vocational psychology and career counseling, indecisiveness 
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is frequently described as a maladaptive personality trait and indecision as a normal 
developmental phase  (Holland & Holland, 1977; Taylor & Betz, 1993). This distinction, 
however, does not appear to be widely adopted outside the field of vocational counseling, 
with many researchers using the terms indecisiveness and indecision interchangeably. 
The study of indecisiveness has been limited by the absence of a widely accepted 
definition of the term, validated self-report and behavioral measures, and a coherent 
model of its relationship to psychopathology. Furthermore, research on indecisiveness is 
also complicated by its conceptual overlap with related constructs such as decision 
avoidance (Anderson, 2003), procrastination (Ferrari & McCown, 1994), and experiential 
avoidance (Hayes et al., 1996).   
Much of our knowledge of indecisiveness and its behavioral correlates comes 
from studies of nonclinical samples. Self-reported indecisiveness has been associated 
with prolonged information searches (Rassin, 2007; Rassin & Muris, 2005), greater 
preference for “I don’t know” responses on a questionnaire requiring judgments of 
ambiguous situations (Rassin et al., 2007; Rassin & Muris, 2005), less confidence in 
decisions (Gaff, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996), and greater difficulty choosing undergraduate 
majors and career paths (Gaff et al., 1996; Gayton et al., 1994). Self-reported 
indecisiveness is highly correlated with measures of depression, worry, and obsessive-
compulsive symptoms in nonclinical samples (Frost & Shows, 1993; Rassin et al., 2006), 
underscoring the importance of studying the construct in individuals with anxiety and 
mood disorders.  
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Despite a proliferation of decision-making research over the past 15 years, the 
relationship between decision-making and psychopathology, particularly anxiety and 
unipolar mood disorders, remains uncertain. Clearly, one challenge to decision science is 
that decision-making is likely composed of multiple cognitive processes. As such, one 
could define dysfunctional decision-making in multiple ways: making decisions too 
slowly or impulsively; making decisions likely to result in negative outcomes; or 
experiencing significant distress during the decision-making process. The current study 
draws from two lines of inquiry in decision science: one, informed by affective 
neuroscience and neuropsychology, that investigates the association between 
psychopathology and risky decision-making, and another that has focused on the 
affective and behavioral correlates of indecisiveness. These lines of research have 
remained largely separate, perhaps reflecting the disparate theories and models that have 
guided research in the field.  
Models of Decision-Making Impairment 
  Multiple models of have been proposed to account for decision-making 
impairments observed in psychiatric and neurologic populations. Some of these are 
disorder-specific (e.g., Sachdev & Malhi, 2005), whereas others attempt to explain 
decision-making abnormalities across a range of populations (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 2000; Paulus, 2007). Below we review some of the most relevant to 
understanding decision-making in patients with anxiety and mood disorders.   
Perhaps the most the widely cited model of impaired decision-making is 
Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, the basic tenets of which were described 
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above. According to this model, individuals with VM damage and certain psychiatric 
disorders either fail to generate measurable somatic responses when contemplating 
decisions or fail to attend to them. Consequently, they lack important information on 
which to base their choices. Bechara, Damasio, et al. (2000) have suggested that the 
somatic marker hypothesis may be applicable to a range of psychiatric disorders (e.g., 
alcohol/substance use, schizophrenia, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
depression). However, studies of patients with unipolar mood and anxiety disorders have 
produced mixed results on the IGT and similar gambling tasks (Jollant et al., 2005; Must 
et al., 2006; Paulus, 2007). Furthermore, it remains unclear if the proposed 
neuroanatomical mechanism behind the somatic marker hypothesis (i.e., disruption in the 
processing of emotional signals in the VM) is, in fact, relevant to the study of patients 
with unipolar mood and anxiety disorders.  
Like the somatic marker hypothesis, Paulus’s (2007) transdiagnostic model of 
decision-making impairment presumes that interoceptive valuation of options guides 
decision-making. This model proposes, however, that decision-making dysfunction in 
psychiatric populations results from dysregulation of homeostatic balance. Dysfunction in 
phases of the decision-making process—including misevaluation of options, suboptimal 
choices, and inaccurate evaluation of outcomes—are presumed to result from 
maladaptive efforts to achieve homeostasis. Paulus (2005, 2007) proposes that altered 
decision-making in depression results from dysfunctions in reward processing (and 
concomitant decreased interest in or pleasure from participation in activities), whereas 
dysfunction in anxiety disorders results from increased sensitivity to aversive outcomes. 
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According to this model, a variety of brain regions may underlie decision-making 
deficits, with decreased ventral striatal activation implicated in depression, and increased 
activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
implicated in anxiety disorders. Nevertheless, Paulus and Yu (2012) noted that 
researchers have yet to link specific anxiety or mood states or disorders to decision-
making dysfunction. 
 Other researchers have advanced disorder-specific models of decision-making 
impairment. For example, Sachdev and Malhi (2005) have argued that OCD is 
fundamentally a disorder of decision-making, resulting from decisions acquiring an 
abnormal emotional valence due to over-activity in the orbitofrontal cortex. The authors 
propose that decision-making becomes associated with increased negative affect, 
resulting in abnormal activation of the ACC and prolonged decision-making efforts. 
Empirical support for this model is limited, with several studies failing to detect any 
decision-making abnormalities among non-hoarding individuals with OCD (Lawrence et 
al., 2006; Milner et al., 1971; Starcke et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it is notable given the 
long association between OCD and indecisiveness in the clinical and research literature 
(e.g., Milner et al., 1971).   
 Models to account for indecisiveness have typically appeared outside of the 
neuroscience literature. Anderson (2003) has proposed a model of decision avoidance 
that describes the antecedents (e.g., anticipated regret, costs of action and change) and 
consequences (e.g., regret, fear regulation) of postponing decisions. Rassin (2007) 
attempted to integrate previous research on indecisiveness into a coherent model that 
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offers a precise definition of the construct and describes its corresponding behaviors. In 
this model, “indecisives” are distinguishable from “decisives” by their tendencies to (1) 
delay decisions, (2) experience decisional “tunnel vision” (i.e., seeking out more 
information about their eventual choice, but less information about non-chosen options), 
and (3) display dysfunctional post-decision behavior (e.g., worrying, checking, 
reconsideration of decisions). Although useful in specifying some of the behaviors 
associated with indecisiveness, neither model explicitly addresses the relationship 
between psychopathology and indecisiveness. Unfortunately, there is substantial variation 
in how indecisiveness has been defined and operationalized, with over 20 definitions 
appearing across literatures (Potworowski, 2010). Indecisiveness has variously been 
described as a trait, a behavior (e.g., prolonged decision latency), and an emotional state 
(e.g, distress about the decision-making process), undermining attempts to establish its 
relationship with theoretically related constructs.  
Janis and Mann (1977) offered one of the few models of decision-making 
impairment that is closely linked to a psychological intervention. Their conflict theory 
model proposes that decisional conflict arises when an individual obtains information that 
threatens his or her current state of mind, resulting in uncertainty, apprehension, and 
dysfunctional coping behaviors (e.g., making poor choices, avoiding decisions). Janis and 
Mann identified two sources of stress arising from decisional conflict: (1) concern about 
material and social losses as a result of a particular decision and (2) apprehension about 
losing one’s reputation or self-perception as a competent decision maker. Decisional 
conflict, they argued, typically results in five distinct patterns of coping: (1) unconflicted 
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adherence, in which the decision maker continues what he or she has been doing and 
ignores risks, (2) unconflicted change to a new course of action, in which the decision 
maker adopts a new course of action without critically evaluating it, (3) defensive 
avoidance, in which the decision maker engages in procrastination or shifts decision-
making responsibility to someone else, (4) hypervigilance, in which the highly anxious 
decision-maker impulsively chooses an alternative that may provide immediate relief, 
without adequately considering its long-term consequences, and (5) vigilance, in which 
the individual makes an effort to seek out all relevant information and considers it 
carefully before making a choice. Noting that defensive avoidance is perhaps the most 
commonly observed response to difficult decisions, Janis and Mann (1977) proposed a 
variety of strategies to assist the decision maker, including role-playing, creation of a 
decisional balance sheet, and stress inoculation training for post-decision setbacks. 
Although some parts of Janis and Mann’s (1977) theory are broadly consistent with idea 
that anxiety leads to behavioral avoidance (e.g., Hayes et al., 1996) , neither their theory 
nor counseling approach has been formally tested.  
 In summary, multiple models of decision-making impairment have appeared in 
the literature, but few have generated much empirical support. Bechara’s somatic marker 
hypothesis is the most frequently tested of the models reviewed above, though its 
relevance to anxiety and mood disorders is unclear. None of the models reviewed above 
addresses both decision-making under risk and indecisiveness, which is consistent with 
the fragmentation of the literature, but may also suggest that these two types of decision-
making impairment are independent from one another. 
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Decision-Making Impairment in Emotional Disorders 
 Research on decision-making impairment in psychiatric disorders is disjointed, 
with one line of inquiry, informed by Bechara’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, 
focused on decision-making under risky conditions, and another focused on 
indecisiveness. Thus, the review below attempts to clarify the nature of the decision-
making deficits under study, as well as the methods used to assess them. Unipolar 
depression, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and OCD are the focus of this review, 
both because clinical descriptions of these disorders have suggested decision-making 
impairment and because of the phenomenological similarity and high rates of 
comorbidity between them (Brown, Campbell, et al., 2001; Brown, Abramowitz & Foa, 
1998).  
Unipolar depression. Most investigations of decision-making under risk in 
unipolar depression have relied on the IGT or other gambling tasks. The results of several 
studies suggest that patients with depression exhibit impaired performance (i.e., earn 
fewer points or less money) relative to non-depressed participants on these tasks (Murphy 
et al., 2001; Must et al., 2006). Contrary to evidence that depression is associated with 
decreased reward sensitivity (Eshel & Roiser, 2010), depressed patients’ performance in 
one study appeared consistent with increased sensitivity to short-term reward and blunted 
reactivity to punishment on a modified version of the IGT (Must et al., 2006). Additional 
evidence for the effect of sadness and depression on decision-making comes from studies 
involving affective inductions in nonclinical samples. In one such study, sad individuals 
exhibited greater preference for high-risk/high-reward options than anxious individuals 
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on a task requiring them to choose between a variety of options with defined odds 
(Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), results that suggest that anxiety and depression may 
produce distinct effects on tasks assessing decision-making under risk.  
Not all studies, however, have found that depressed patients exhibit impaired 
performance on tasks designed to assess risky decision-making and reward- and 
punishment-based learning. Jollant et al. (2007) failed to find an association between 
unipolar depression and impaired IGT performance when they controlled for past suicide 
attempts. Smoski et al., (2008) found that depressed participants’ performance on the IGT 
was superior to normal controls’ across all five blocks of trials on the IGT, suggesting 
greater risk aversion. Of note, neither Jollant et al. (2007) nor Smoski et al. (2008) 
controlled for the presence of comorbid anxiety disorders.    
Given the inclusion of indecisiveness in the diagnostic criteria for MDD and 
dysthymia, there have been surprisingly few investigations of it in patients with unipolar 
depression. Because there are no widely used, standardized measures of indecisiveness, 
these studies have typically relied on tasks designed by the investigators to simulate real-
life decision-making. In a study assessing the effect of a rumination induction on 
indecisiveness, dysphoric and control participants completed a computer-administered 
task requiring them to choose between two options in a series of decision scenarios (van 
Randenborgh, de Jong-Meyer, & Hüffmeier, 2010). Dysphoric ruminators were less 
confident in their decisions, perceived decision-making as more difficult, and exhibited 
longer decision latencies relative to both non-dysphoric individuals and dysphoric non-
ruminators. In another study, depressed inpatients reported more decisional conflict than 
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healthy controls, with high levels of conflict associated with low self-efficacy, poor 
concentration, and high levels of rumination (van Randenborgh et al., 2010). Positive 
associations between self-reported depression and indecisiveness have been documented 
in nonclinical samples (Rassin et al., 2006; Rassin & Muris, 2005), although Di Schiena, 
Luminet, Chang, and Philippot (2013) failed to find a significant relationship. None of 
these studies has attempted to determine the unique contribution of various types of 
psychopathology to indecisiveness. Of note, the few studies that have reported decision 
time as a behavioral marker of indecisiveness have found mixed results. Murphy et al. 
(2001) found that patients with unipolar and bipolar depression took significantly more 
time to make decisions than control participants on a behavioral gambling task. Van 
Randenborgh, de Jong-Meyer, and Huffmeier (2009) observed only marginally longer 
decision times in dysphoric individuals than in control participants.  
Anxiety disorders. Although not included in the diagnostic criteria for anxiety 
disorders, decision-making impairment has been proposed as the core deficit in OCD 
(Sachdev & Malhi, 2005) and investigated as a correlate of GAD (Mueller, Nguyen, Ray, 
& Borkovec, 2010). Similar to the literature on depression and decision-making, research 
linking anxiety to decision-making impairment includes both studies of decision-making 
in the context of risk and indecisiveness.  
Anxiety signals the presence of threat and promotes protective responses (Barlow, 
2004). Is it not surprising, therefore, that multiple studies have demonstrated that anxiety, 
operationalized in various ways, is associated with risk-averse decision-making in 
nonclinical and clinical samples (Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010; Maner 
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et al., 2007; Mueller et al., 2010). High scorers on a self-report measure of GAD 
symptoms learned to avoid decisions with a high probability of long-term losses faster 
than non-anxious control participants (Mueller et al., 2010) and individuals with non-
hoarding OCD demonstrated comparable IGT performance to community controls 
(Grisham, Brown, Savage, Steketee, & Barlow, 2007; Lawrence et al., 2006; Nielen, 
Veltman, de Jong, Mulder, & Boer, 2002). Nevertheless, some studies using the IGT or 
similar paradigms have found that anxiety, and OCD in particular, is associated with 
impaired decision-making (Cavedini et al., 2002; Kashyup, Kumar, Kandavel, & Reddy, 
in press; Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008). Furthermore, there is some indication that 
patients with OCD exhibit superior performance to control participants on a gambling 
task in which the rules are made explicit (Starcke et al., 2010). One study has found 
differential performance between anxiety disorders on the IGT, with patients with OCD 
demonstrating greater risk taking (i.e., poorer performance) than both healthy controls 
and individuals with panic disorder (Cavedini et al., 2002). 
Like depression, anxiety disorders have long been associated with indecisiveness, 
with Milner et al. (1971) linking obsessionality to decision deferral and Fava, Savron, 
Rafanelli, Grandi, and Canestrari (1996) identifying indecisiveness as a prodromal 
symptom of OCD. Nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence of a relationship 
between OCD and indecisiveness. Significant correlations have been observed between 
self-reported indecisiveness and OCD symptoms (Rassin et al., 2007), with some 
indication that indecisiveness is most strongly associated with doubting and checking 
symptoms (Frost & Shows, 1993). Using a behavioral decision-making task, Foa et al. 
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(2003) found that individuals with OCD spent more time deliberating about low-risk 
decisions (e.g., what car wax to buy) than control participants, and that self-reported 
OCD symptoms, but not depression symptoms, predicted decision latency.  
Despite high rates of comorbidity and phenomenological overlap with depression 
and OCD (Brown, Campbell, et al., 2001; Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998), there have 
been few investigations of the relationship between GAD and indecisiveness. 
Researchers have found significant zero-order correlations between self-report measures 
of GAD and indecisiveness (Rassin et al., 2006; Rassin & Muris, 2005) and individuals 
with OCD report significantly more indecisiveness when GAD is present (Abramowitz & 
Foa, 1998). In addition, GAD patients exhibit deficits in implementing solutions to 
problems, report less confidence in their ability to solve problems, and experience lower 
perceived control over the problem solving process (Davey, 1994; Ladouceur, Blais, 
Freeston, & Dugas, 1998). Unfortunately, there have been no attempts, theoretical or 
empirical, to distinguish problem solving from decision-making, though they appear to be 
overlapping constructs.  
Other psychiatric disorders. Most recent research examining decision-making 
and psychopathology has focused on disorders characterized by impulsivity, particularly 
bipolar I disorder and alcohol/substance dependence. Like patients with damage to the 
VM, decision-making in individuals with these disorders is characterized by inadequate 
consideration of negative consequences. Consistent with the clinical features of these 
diagnoses, individuals with bipolar I and alcohol/substance dependence exhibit deficits 
on IGT, demonstrating a preference for high-risk/high-reward cards (Grant, Contoreggi, 
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& London, 2000; Rubinsztein, Michael, Underwood, Tempest, & Sahakian, 2006; 
Verdejo-García et al., 2007). 
Summary. The results of studies examining the association between depression 
and gambling task performance are equivocal, with some suggesting that depression 
impairs performance (Murphy et al., 2001; Must et al., 2006), and others finding that IGT 
performance is unaffected (Jollant, et al., 2007) or even enhanced (Smoski et al., 2006) in 
depressed individuals.  
The association between depression and putative markers of indecisiveness is 
somewhat more consistent than the link between depression and decision-making under 
risk, with several studies indicating that depression is associated with more distress 
surrounding the decision-making process (e.g., greater perceptions of difficulty, less 
confidence in decisions), and multiple studies finding significant bivariate correlations 
between self-reported depression and self-reported indecisiveness. There is limited 
evidence, however, of a relationship between depression and prolonged decision times, 
with few studies having reported this outcome.  
The evidence linking anxiety disorders to decision-making impairment is 
similarly inconsistent and complicated by the use of a variety of tasks purporting to 
assess similar constructs. Anxiety, broadly defined, appears to be associated with 
advantageous (i.e., risk-averse) choices on behavioral tasks and self-report 
questionnaires. Nevertheless, both trait anxiety and OCD symptoms have been linked to 
impaired performance on the IGT. Studies of the relationship between anxiety and 
decision-making under risk highlight the importance of examining performance over the 
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course of the IGT rather than merely using total net score as the primary outcome, given 
that different types of psychopathology may influence performance on some blocks, but 
not others (Mueller et al., 2010). Both OCD and GAD are associated at the bivariate level 
with self-reported indecisiveness, though few studies have confirmed the link between 
anxiety and indecisiveness using behavioral tasks (Foa et al., 2003).    
 The link between decision-making impairment and unipolar depression and 
anxiety disorders has not yet been clearly established. The variety of decision tasks used 
impedes the comparison of one study to another and the use of subclinical or highly 
restricted samples (i.e., ones with no comorbid disorders) make it difficult to generalize 
findings to real-world patients, among whom comorbidity is the rule rather than the 
exception (Brown, Campbell, et al., 2001). Thus, some of the inconsistency in findings 
reported above may be due to a failure to consider the effect of comorbid diagnoses on 
task performance. Furthermore, our understanding of decision-making impairment in 
anxiety and unipolar mood disorders may be enhanced by the measurement of relevant 
neuropsychological variables.  
Neuropsychological Impairment and Decision-Making 
Given that decision-making is such a complex task, one might hypothesize that it 
is influenced by multiple cognitive skills. Nevertheless, no studies of indecisiveness have 
included the measurement of potentially relevant cognitive variables (e.g., processing 
speed). In contrast, numerous studies of risk-related decision-making, frequently studied 
in neurologic samples, have included measures of cognitive variables. 
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The IGT was explicitly designed to measure decision-making in the absence other 
cognitive deficits, based on the theory that damage to the VM selectively impairs 
decision-making, while leaving other abilities (e.g., memory, executive functions) 
preserved (Bechara et al., 1994). Since Bechara et al.’s (1994) original paper on the IGT, 
however, multiple studies have documented associations between impaired cognitive 
functions, particularly executive functioning (a broad term that often includes, but is not 
limited to, set shifting, organization, and response inhibition), and disadvantageous 
decision-making. Significant correlations have been found between the Trail Making Test 
(Trails B, in particular) and overall IGT performance among eating disordered patients 
(Brand, Franke-Sievert, Jacoby, Markowitsch, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2007), patients with 
substance use disorders, and normal control participants (Barry & Petry, 2008). 
Researchers have also found significant associations between decision making and other 
measures of executive functioning (e.g., Noël, Bechara, Dan, Hanak, & Verbanck, 2007).  
Few studies have examined the association between performance on cognitive 
tasks and the IGT among patients with unipolar depression and anxiety, and neither found 
an association between neuropsychological measures and IGT performance (Jollant et al., 
2007; Starcke et al., 2010). A recent review indicated that a minority of studies 
examining the association between cognitive function and decision-making performance 
found significant associations between net total scores on the IGT and executive 
functioning or global measures of intelligence (Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & 
Stanovich, 2010). Among studies finding significant associations, effect sizes were small 
to modest, leading the authors to conclude that, consistent with Bechara et al.’s (1994) 
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original IGT paper, decision-making performance is independent of other cognitive 
abilities.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between decision-making and cognitive function, 
particularly in the context of anxiety and mood disorders, remains understudied given the 
array of cognitive deficits that have been documented among individuals with anxiety 
and depression. Depression has been linked with deficits in memory and executive 
functioning  (Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Goodwin, 1997; Mahurin et al., 2006; 
Moritz et al., 2002) across a broad range of age groups (e.g., (Abas, Sahakian, & Levy, 
1990; Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001; Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1997; 
Tarbuck & Paykel, 1995). In addition, patients with depression often exhibit marked 
psychomotor slowing, as evidenced by slower speech, body movements, and reaction 
time than healthy adults (Sobin & Sackeim, 1997). Consistent with these observations, 
depression has been associated with longer decision times on simple (Hickie, Scott, 
Wilhelm, & Brodaty, 1997) and complex (Murphy et al., 2001) decision-making tasks. 
Notably, no previous studies have examined the relationship between psychomotor 
slowing, as measured by standardized neuropsychological tests, depression, and 
laboratory tasks of decision-making.  
Several mechanisms may account for the neuropsychological deficits observed in 
depressed patients. The resource-allocation hypothesis states that depressed individuals 
may suffer from decreased cognitive capacity, with depression occupying or functionally 
reducing their cognitive resources (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1989). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Hasher and Zacks (1979) proposed that individuals with depression are 
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selectively impaired on effortful tasks (e.g, problem solving, semantic encoding, free 
recall, speeded tests), whereas their performance on tasks requiring automatic processing 
(e.g., frequency judgments, retrieval of self-relevant words) is relatively preserved (see 
Hartlage, Alloy, Vázquez, & Dykman, 1993, for a review). Because “effortful” may be 
defined in myriad ways, it is unclear how useful the automatic-effortful distinction is in 
explaining task performance. However, because decision-making likely requires a variety 
of cognitive skills (e.g., attention, working memory, and response inhibition), it is 
typically regarded as an effortful task. Motivation may also play an important role in 
neuropsychological task performance and the conservative response bias observed in 
some studies has been cited as evidence of depressed patients’ low hedonic capacity 
relative to nondepressed participants (Meehl, 1975).  
The evidence of cognitive dysfunction in anxiety disorders is not as robust as it is 
for depression (Castaneda, Tuulio-Henriksson, Marttunen, Suvisaari, & Lönnqvist, 2008). 
Whereas few studies have documented neurocognitive deficits in GAD (e.g., Gualtieri & 
Morgan, 2008), social phobia (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996), and panic disorder (e.g., Lucas, 
Telch, & Bigler, 1991), numerous studies have found evidence of attention and executive 
functioning deficits in OCD using a variety of tasks (e.g., Cavallaro et al., 2003; Kim, 
Park, Shin, & Kwon, 2002; Moritz et al., 2002; Penadés, Catalán, Andrés, Salamero, & 
Gastó, 2005; Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1998). At least one study has 
documented processing speed deficits in the context of OCD (Burdick, Robinson, 
Malhotra, & Szeszko, 2008).  
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In summary, there is a paucity of studies examining the association between 
cognitive deficits in depression and anxiety and decision-making, and no studies 
explicitly linking neuropsychological test performance to indecisiveness. However, a 
broader literature examining neuropsychological deficits among individuals with anxiety 
and depression suggests that processing speed and executive functioning may be 
particularly vulnerable in these populations and important to study in the context of 
decision-making. Del Missier, Mäntylä, and Bruin (2011) have recently argued that 
different cognitive skills may subserve different types of decision-making. Indeed, one 
might hypothesize that processing speed would be more likely to affect decision latency 
on a task assessing indecisiveness and, consistent with prior research, executive functions 
might be more likely to affect performance on the IGT.  
Clinical Relevance of Decision-Making Impairment 
 Despite the inclusion of indecisiveness in the diagnostic criteria for MDD for over 
30 years and researchers’ argument that deficits in decision-making under risk are critical 
to understanding a variety of mental disorders (Lee, 2013; Sachdev & Malhi, 2005), the 
most commonly used manualized treatments for anxiety and unipolar depression do not 
include interventions that explicitly target decision-making impairment.  
Within the career counseling literature, however, researchers have proposed 
multiple interventions to address vocational indecision (e.g., Mendonca & Siess, 1976; 
Savickas, 1995). Many of these are derived from D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s (1971)  
problem-solving training (PST). Developed as a treatment for a variety of behavioral 
problems, PST teaches patients to evaluate the personal, social, short-term, and long-term 
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consequences of various decision options, and to create a solution plan. The authors’ 
definition of problem solving is similar to others’ characterization of effective decision-
making: a behavioral process that “makes available a variety of potentially effective 
response alternatives” and “increases the probability of selecting the most effective 
response” (p. 108). Problem-solving training has been tested in numerous clinical 
samples and meta-analyses have supported its efficacy in the treatment of depression 
(Bell & D'Zurilla, 2009) and a variety of other mental and physical health problems 
(Malouff, Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2007). Studies evaluating PST have examined 
treatment outcomes using self-report measures of clinical symptoms, but have not 
assessed patients’ performance on behavioral decision-making tasks pre- and post-
treatment, so it is unclear if decision-making impairment resolves when depression 
remits. Although not developed to address decision-making deficits per se, cognitive 
reappraisal, a technique common to many forms of cognitive-behavioral therapy, may 
alter decision-making by down-regulating negative emotions and increasing adaptive 
risk-taking (Heilman et al., 2010).   
Decision-making may also be relevant to clinical care through its effect on 
treatment outcome. Elevated perceptions of risk have been associated with lower 
willingness to seek treatment (Lorian & Grisham, 2011). Cognitive-behavioral therapy 
for GAD has been found to increase social and recreational risk-taking (Lorian, Titov, & 
Grisham, 2012), suggesting that, among clinically anxious individuals, decreasing risk 
aversion may be therapeutic. In contrast, high risk-taking as measured by the IGT 
predicts poorer response to pharmacological treatment among patients with OCD 
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(Cavedini et al., 2002), three-month relapse among patients with substance dependence 
(De Wilde, Verdejo-García, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & Dom, 2013), and self-reported social 
dysfunction among cocaine-dependent individuals (Cunha, Bechara, de Andrade, & 
Nicastri, 2011). These findings not only support the ecological validity of the IGT and 
measures of risk aversion, but provide evidence that individuals’ decision-making 
abilities may be an important consideration in treatment.   
Implications for Diagnostic Criteria  
 
 References to decision-making impairment, and indecisiveness in particular, have 
appeared in the criteria sets for multiple Axis I and II disorders. In addition to its 
inclusion in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) criteria for MDD and persistent depressive disorder 
(formerly dysthymic disorder), indecisiveness was included in the DSM-III-R (APA, 
1987) definition of obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, though not retained in 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994). A variation of indecisiveness (“difficulty making everyday 
decisions without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others”) was 
included in the definition of DSM-IV dependent personality disorder.  
Despite its appearances in multiple editions of the DSM, there is limited evidence 
to support the inclusion of indecisiveness in the criteria for any disorder. The prevalence 
of decision-making difficulty among depressed patients is unclear, due in part to the use 
of compound criteria in the definitions of MDD and dysthymic disorder. Two-thirds of 
the DSM-5 criteria (which are identical to the DSM-IV-TR criteria) for MDD are 
compound, meaning that they include multiple features (e.g., difficulty concentrating and 
indecisiveness) or contrasting symptoms (e.g., excessive sleep and insomnia). Noting the 
 27  
 
dearth of research documenting the sensitivity and specificity of the MDD criteria, 
Mitchell et al. (2008) examined the performance of the DSM-IV-TR criteria in a large 
sample of psychiatric outpatients. Indecisiveness, rated by interviewers administering 
structured diagnostic interviews, was highly accurate in discriminating depressed from 
non-depressed patients (i.e., endorsed by the majority of patients diagnosed with MDD, 
but rarely reported by those without MDD). However, an earlier study by the same 
research group found that indecisiveness was endorsed by only 5.6% of patients meeting 
the mood or loss of interest criteria for MDD, leading the authors to suggest that the 
cognitive disturbance criterion be simplified to include only impaired concentration 
(Zimmerman, Chelminski, McGlinchey, & Young, 2006).  
Indecisiveness (or “difficulty making decisions”) has been retained in the DSM-5 
(APA, 2013) diagnostic criteria for MDD and persistent depressive disorder despite the 
absence of an empirical basis for its inclusion. Of note, early in the DSM-5 revision 
process, Andrews et al. (2010) proposed new criteria for GAD that included several 
behavioral manifestations of anxiety, including “marked procrastination in behavior or 
decision-making due to worries” (p. 144). Indecisiveness has also been studied as one of 
the defining features of hoarding (Frost, Tolin, Steketee, & Oh, 2011) and indecision 
associated with discarding was included in proposed criteria for hoarding disorder 
(Mataix-Cols et al., 2010). Although it was ultimately not included in the DSM-5 
definitions of GAD or hoarding disorder, indecisiveness’s inclusion in proposed criteria 
sets suggests that it is a clinical phenomenon warranting further study. 
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No previous studies have attempted to determine whether indecisiveness is 
associated with multiple measures of psychopathology in a clinical sample. Thus, one of 
the goals of the current study was to contribute to the classification literature by 
determining the specificity of the relationship between certain emotional disorders and 
decision-making impairment.  
Current Study  
  Although the study of decision-making has grown dramatically in recent years, 
our understanding of decision-making impairment in unipolar depression and anxiety 
disorders remains limited. Much of the research on decision-making has focused on risk-
related decision-making rather than indecisiveness, and has only rarely considered the 
effect of comorbid conditions on decision-making performance. Those studies that have 
examined indecisiveness have typically not referenced the wider decision-making 
literature or taken into account the role of various neurocognitive skills (e.g., processing 
speed) in decision-making impairment. Moreover, many investigations of decision-
making impairment in unipolar mood and anxiety disorders have been analog studies, 
relying on nonclinical samples and mood inductions to make inferences about the 
decision-making of individuals with emotional disorders.  
  Basic questions about the nature of decision-making in anxiety and mood 
disorders remain unanswered: Do depression and anxiety (specifically, GAD and OCD) 
independently predict self-reported indecisiveness? Are depression and anxiety 
associated with behavioral correlates of indecisiveness (e.g., prolonged decision times)? 
Do depression and anxiety predict differential performance on tasks assessing risky 
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decision-making? Are associations between psychopathology and decision-making 
performance mediated by neurocognitive variables? Is decision-making impairment in 
anxiety and mood disorders associated with real-life functional impairment?  
  The current study is an initial attempt to answer these questions and to integrate 
the disparate modes of inquiry that have characterized decision-making research by: (1) 
studying a treatment-seeking clinical sample that has undergone extensive diagnostic 
assessment; (2) employing multiple decision-making tasks, including one designed for 
this study to simulate real-life decision scenarios; and (3) measuring multiple variables 
(e.g., self-reported psychopathology, cognitive functions) that might account for 
individuals’ performance on decision-making tasks.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-five participants were recruited from patients who presented for 
assessment and treatment at the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders (CARD). 
Patients were recruited for the study if they met criteria for any anxiety or unipolar mood 
disorder based on a diagnostic assessment using the Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule for DSM-IV: Lifetime Version or a follow-up assessment using the non-lifetime 
version of the ADIS (ADIS-IV-L; Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). Patients were 
eligible for the study if they met criteria for MDD, dysthymic disorder, depression not 
otherwise specified (NOS), GAD, OCD, panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, 
specific phobia, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), social phobia, or anxiety disorder 
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NOS as either a principal or additional diagnosis. Patients were excluded from the study 
if they were diagnosed with ADHD, bipolar disorder, or alcohol/substance use disorders.  
Due to technical problems, one participant did not complete the computer-
administered tasks. Although no participant received a diagnosis of ADHD during his or 
her diagnostic assessment at CARD, nine reported having previously been diagnosed 
with the disorder. Of these individuals, only one reported currently interfering symptoms 
of ADHD and exhibited marked difficulty completing the neuropsychological and 
computer-administered testing. Data from this participant have been excluded from all 
analyses.  
 The most common principal or co-principal diagnoses were social phobia, 
generalized anxiety disorder, and panic disorder (Table 1). The majority of the sample (n 
= 43, 58%) met criteria for two or more Axis I diagnoses. A CSR of 6 or 7, indicative of 
severe symptoms, was assigned to the principal diagnosis in 40.5% of cases. Fifty-two 
(70.3%) individuals were recruited after their participation in intake assessments and 22 
(29.7%) were recruited after follow-up assessments. The majority of participants (n = 62, 
83.8%) were right-handed. Less than half of participants (n = 32, 43.2%) reported current 
use of psychotropic medications. The most commonly reported psychotropic medications 
were antidepressants (n = 22, 29.7%), anxiolytics (n = 19, 25.7%), beta-blockers (n = 5, 
6.8%), and stimulants (n = 4, 5.4%). Additional sample demographic characteristics are 
presented in Table 2.  
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Study Procedures 
Recruitment. The experimenter and a recruitment assistant contacted patients by 
phone following their completion of an intake or follow-up assessment at CARD. If 
patients agreed to participate in the study, they were scheduled for a two-hour laboratory 
session. In an attempt to ensure that an adequate range of depressive symptoms was 
represented in the sample, 21 participants (28% of the total sample) had clinical 
diagnoses of MDD, MDD in partial remission, dysthymic disorder, and depressive 
disorder NOS were recruited.
1
 
Study Session. Participants signed a consent form, completed self-report 
questionnaires, neuropsychological measures, and decision-making tasks (described in 
detail below). The order of the decision-making tasks was counterbalanced. At the end of 
the study session, participants were provided with a brief description of the study and 
invited to ask further questions. Participants received a $25.00 check in return for their 
participation. 
Diagnostic Assessment 
 Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV: Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV-L; 
Di Nardo et al., 1994). The ADIS-IV-L is a semi-structured interview designed for the 
assessment of current and past anxiety and mood disorders. Reliability estimates for the 
                                                 
1
 The prospectus for this study called for a total sample size of 70, with half the sample 
diagnosed with MDD or dysthymic disorder, and at least 15 of those individuals having 
moderate or severe presentations of MDD. Due to difficulties recruiting patients with 
depression, the recruitment plan was revised to require that least 20 patients with unipolar 
depression (MDD of any severity level or course, dysthymic disorder, or depressive 
disorder NOS) complete the study. 
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majority of anxiety and mood disorders assessed using the ADIS-IV-L have been in the 
good to excellent range (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). When 
administering the ADIS-IV-L, interviewers assign each diagnosis a 0-8 clinical severity 
rating (CSR) that represents the degree of distress and/or functional impairment 
associated with that set of symptoms. The interviewers assign a “principal” diagnosis to 
the set of symptoms that is most severe. All other diagnoses are labeled as “additional.”  
Self-Report Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II 
is a widely used measure of depression. It consists of 21 items and includes items that 
assess cognitive-affective symptoms of depression and nonspecific symptoms related to 
general distress and negative affect (e.g., irritability, sleeplessness). Items are summed to 
create a total score.  
Indecisiveness Scale (IS; Frost & Shows, 1993). The 15 items of the IS are 
measured on are a Likert-type scale ranging from one (“strongly disagree”) to five 
(“strongly agree”) and are summed to create a total score. Higher scores are associated 
with stronger levels of indecisiveness. In nonclinical samples, the IS has demonstrated 
high internal consistency (.90; Frost & Shows, 1993), high four-week test-rest reliability 
(Rassin et al., 2006), and significant zero-order correlations with measures of depression, 
worry, and OCD symptoms (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton et al., 1994). High scores 
have been associated with longer decision latencies on a behavioral decision-making task 
(Frost & Shows, 1993).  
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Of note, the IS has infrequently been used in studies of clinical samples, with the 
exception of investigations of hoarding and non-hoarding OCD patients (e.g., Steketee, 
Frost, & Kyrios, 2003). Although the IS has been criticized for its inclusion of both 
domain-specific (“When ordering from a menu, I usually find it difficult to decide what 
to get”) and general items (“I find it easy to make decisions”), and for its unidimensional 
measurement of a supposedly multidimensional construct (Gayton et al., 1994; Rassin, 
2007), it remains the most widely used measure of indecisiveness in clinical psychology.   
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory—Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R 
is an 18-item measure that assesses six types of OCD symptoms: checking/doubting, 
obsessing, mental neutralizing, ordering, hoarding, and harming. The respondent rates the 
distress associated with each symptom on a five-point scale ranging from zero (“not at 
all”) to four (“extremely”). Items are summed to create a total score. The OCI-R has 
demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability in a sample of patients 
diagnosed with a variety anxiety disorders, as well as in a sample of control participants 
(Foa et al., 2002).  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure of trait worry. Items are scored on Likert-type 
scale ranging from one (“not at all typical of me”) to five (“very typical of me”) and 
summed to create a total score. The measure exhibits unidimensional structure, sufficient 
reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity in nonclinical samples and in 
patients diagnosed with a variety of mood and anxiety disorders (Brown, 2003; Brown, 
Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Meyer et al., 1990).  
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Subjective Symptoms Scale (SSS; Hafner & Marks, 1976). The SSS is a five-item 
scale assessing how much current symptoms interfere with work, home management, 
private leisure, social leisure, and family relationships. The respondent rates each item on 
a nine-point scale ranging from zero (“not at all”) to eight (“severe”). Prior studies have 
supported the unidimensionality of the SSS (Brown & Barlow, 1995). 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). The BIS-
11 is a 30-item scale assessing the personality trait of impulsiveness. Respondents rate 
items (e.g., “I make up my mind quickly,” “I act on the spur of the moment”) on a four-
point scale ranging from one (“rarely/never”) to four (“almost always/always”). The BIS-
11 has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties (Patton et al., 1995). Although the 
BIS-11 contains three subscales intended to assess different components of impulsivity 
(attentional, motor, and non-planning), there is little evidence to support a three-factor 
structure (Steinberg, Sharp, Stanford, & Tharp, 2013).  
Demographics Questionnaire. All participants completed a brief questionnaire on 
which they reported their age, race, ethnicity, education level, employment status, and 
handedness. In addition, participants were asked to report whether they were currently 
taking psychotropic medication, or had ever received a diagnosis of ADHD or learning 
disorder at a prior diagnostic evaluation.  
Neuropsychological Measures 
 Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 2007). The IGT is a computer-administered 
card game designed to assess emotional decision-making (see Appendix A for task 
instructions and Appendix B for a screenshot of the task). The participant chooses 100 
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cards from four decks, two of which, A and B, are “high risk” (associated with 
intermittent large rewards and long-term losses) and two of which, C and D, are “low 
risk” (associated with small, consistent gains). For every ten cards selected from decks A 
and B, respondents experience a net loss of $250, whereas they experience a net gain of 
$250 for every ten cards selected from decks C and D.  Individuals without neurological 
or psychiatric disorders typically learn to avoid the riskier decks. Net scores were 
calculated by subtracting the total number of disadvantageous cards selected from the 
total number of advantageous cards selected. Higher scores signify more advantageous 
and risk-avoidant decision-making. Evaluation of IGT performance often involves 
repeated measures analysis of performance over the course of five blocks of trials (e.g., 
Lawrence et al., 2006). Although the IGT was originally described as a measure of risky 
decision-making (Bechara et al., 1994), Dunn et al. (2006) and others have argued that 
initial blocks actually measure decision-making under conditions of ambiguity. Later 
blocks, by which time respondents have become aware, either implicitly or explicitly, of 
reward contingencies, are believed to be purer measures of risky decision-making. The 
IGT records the total net score, net score per block, total number of card selections from 
each deck, and decision time (in milliseconds) for each card selection.  
 Wechsler Scales of Intelligence Subtests, 3
rd
 Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997). 
The WAIS-III Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning, and Digit Symbol Coding subtests were 
administered to obtain estimates of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, and psychomotor 
speed. The Vocabulary subset requires participants to define 35 words that are presented 
orally and visually. The subtest is considered a measure of expressive vocabulary, verbal 
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knowledge, and general intelligence. Performance on the subtest tends to be consistent 
even in the context of neurological or psychological disturbance (Lezak, 1995). The 
Matrix Reasoning subtest consists of 26 incomplete visual patterns designed to assess 
visuospatial ability and general intellectual functioning. Participants are instructed to 
examine each pattern and identify the piece that best complete the pattern from among 
five choices. Digit Symbol-Coding is a timed task requiring participants to copy abstract 
symbols associated with numbers. The number of symbols correctly filled in after 120 
seconds serves as a measure of psychomotor speed.  
 Trail Making Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). The Trail Making Test consists of 
two parts. Trails A, a test of simple attention and motor speed, requires participants to 
connect numbered circles in order from one to 25. Trails B, a test of sustained attention, 
set shifting, and cognitive flexibility, requires participants to connect 25 circles, 
alternating between numbers and letters.  
 Stockings of Cambridge (SOC; Cambridge Automated Neuropsychological Test 
Battery (CANTAB), 1995). A modified version of the Tower of London (Shallice, 1982), 
the SOC is a measure of planning and frontostriatal function. The task was administered 
on a touch-screen monitor and required participants to rearrange colored balls in a 
specified number of moves to match a target arrangement. Task difficulty varied 
according to the number of moves required to match the target arrangement. 
Measurements included the number of perfect solutions (i.e., problems solved in the 
minimum number of moves) and time spent planning the sequence of moves before 
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initiating an action. The latter measurement, which excludes the influence of motor 
speed, was examined in the current study as a behavioral marker of indecisiveness. 
MouselabWEB Decision-Making Task 
 An experimenter-designed decision-making task was programmed using 
MouselabWEB (Willemsen & Johnson, 2004) to simulate decisions individual might face 
in their daily lives. MouselabWEB is the web-based version of Mouselab, a software 
application that allows researchers to examine respondents’ decision-making in detail 
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). No previous studies have used MouselabWEB to 
study decision-making in clinical samples, but MouselabWEB has been used to study the 
effect of time pressure and information valence on individuals’ decision-making 
strategies (Maule, Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000) and to simulate decisions about healthcare 
plans (Barnes, Hanoch, Wood, Liu, & Rice, 2013).    
Similar to non-computer-administered tasks used in previous studies (e.g., Isen & 
Means, 1983), the MouselabWEB task required participants to make decisions based on 
multiple pieces of information. Items were intended to simulate decisions that 
participants might make in their daily lives (e.g., which camera to buy, which course to 
take). The items were reviewed and completed by several CARD staff members and 
patients and revised to increase the relevance and clarity of the decision scenarios. The 
final version of the task consisted of nine decision scenarios, each presented as a matrix 
(i.e., three to four choice options described along three to five attributes) (Appendix D). 
Participants “uncovered” information about each choice option by passing the cursor over 
cells in the matrix, with only one cell was visible at a time. The primary dependent 
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variable measured by the MouselabWEB was the average time that participants spent 
making the decision. Participants also rated the difficulty of each decision scenario on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from one (“very easy”) to five (“very difficult”) and the 
similarity of each scenario to decisions they make in their daily lives on a Likert-type 
scale ranging from one (“very different”) to five (“very similar”).  
Study Design 
 Previous studies examining decision-making in patients with anxiety and mood 
disorders have typically relied on between-group designs that compared one diagnostic 
group to another (e.g., Murphy et al., 2001) or a patient sample to a control group (e.g., 
Starcke et al., 2010). There are significant limitations to these approaches when studying 
emotional disorders. High rates of comorbidity have been found among anxiety disorders 
and between anxiety and mood disorders, with one study indicating that 69% of 
individuals with a principal diagnosis of MDD also meet criteria for an anxiety disorder 
diagnosis (Brown, Campbell, et al., 2001). Furthermore, among individuals meeting 
criteria for a principal anxiety disorder diagnosis, rates of comorbid MDD ranged from 
27% (in cases of principal specific phobia) to 90% (in cases of principal PTSD) (Brown 
et al., 2001). Although one could examine decision-making impairments in emotional 
disorders by comparing diagnostic groups, this approach would ignore the fundamentally 
dimensional nature of anxiety and mood disorders (Brown & Barlow, 2005). In the 
current study, all participants completed the same study protocol and levels of depression 
and anxiety were measured with self-report questionnaires or indicated by codes 
representing the presence or absence of diagnoses of interest.   
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Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Related to Indecisiveness 
Hypothesis 1. Consistent with prior research and clinical descriptions of 
depression and OCD, self-reported depression and OCD symptoms were both expected to 
uniquely predict self-reported indecisiveness, while controlling for the effects of worry. 
This hypothesis was tested by regressing IS scores on BDI-II, OCI-R, and PSWQ scores.  
Hypothesis 2. To determine if self-reported depression, OCD symptoms, and 
worry were predictive of putative markers of indecisiveness (decision latency and 
perceived decision difficulty), four regressions were conducted, in which decision time 
on the MouselabWEB task, decision time on the IGT, initiation time on the SOC, and 
difficulty ratings on the MouselabWEB task, respectively, were regressed on BDI-II, 
OCI-R, and PSWQ scores. Although the evidence for the effect of psychopathology on 
decision latency is mixed, it was predicted that depression would be uniquely associated 
with longer decision times on the MouselabWEB task and the IGT. Given evidence that 
depression is associated with perceptions of decision-making difficulty (van 
Randenborgh et al., 2010), depression was also expected to predict difficulty ratings on 
the MouselabWEB task while controlling for worry and OCD symptoms.   
Hypothesis 3. It was predicted that processing speed would partially mediate the 
relationship between psychopathology and markers of indecisiveness (decision times on 
the MouselabWEB task and the IGT). To test these hypotheses, path analyses were 
conducted to test the significance of the direct and indirect paths between measures of 
psychopathology, processing speed, and decision time.  
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Hypothesis 4: Self-reported indecisiveness was hypothesized to mediate the 
relationship between psychopathology and functional impairment. Path analysis was used 
to estimate the direct and indirect paths between measures of psychopathology, scores on 
the IS, and scores on the SSS.  
Hypothesis Related to Risky Decision-Making 
Hypothesis 1. Because there is some evidence that anxious patients are more risk-
avoidant than depressed patients on laboratory gambling tasks (e.g., Maner et al., 2007; 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), worry and OCD symptoms, but not depression, were 
expected to significantly and positively associated with overall performance on the IGT. 
To test this hypothesis, a regression analysis was conducted with net total score earned on 
the IGT as the outcome variable, and BDI-II, OCI-R, and PSWQ scores entered as 
predictors.  
Hypothesis 2. To determine whether scores on tasks of executive functioning 
partially mediate the relationship between self-reported depression or anxiety and overall 
IGT performance, a path analysis that the BDI-II, OCI-R, PSWQ as predictors, the 
number of perfect solutions and performance on Trails B as mediators, and net total score 
on the IGT as the outcome. 
Hypothesis 3. Latent growth modeling (LGM) was used to examine performance 
on the IGT over five blocks of trials. Significant individual variation in the Slope factor 
was expected in the unconditional LGM. The addition of categorical diagnoses as 
covariates was expected to account for significant variance in Slope over the five blocks 
of trials. Although the evidence for the effect of unipolar depression and anxiety 
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disorders on IGT performance is mixed, it was hypothesized that anxiety (defined as the 
presence of GAD or OCD) would be significantly and positively associated with the 
Slope factor, indicating greater change in IGT performance from Block 1 through Block 
5. Depression was expected to be significantly and negatively associated with Slope, 
indicating less change in IGT performance over the course of the task.  
Power Analysis 
 Although few previous studies have examined decision-making in patients with 
anxiety and mood disorders, there is evidence of medium to large effect sizes on the IGT 
when different patient groups were compared with one another (Murphy et al., 2001). 
Cohen (1992) defines a medium effect size in multiple regression (based on the omnibus 
R
2
) as 0.15. A power analysis based on an effect size of 0.15, an alpha level of 0.05, and 
three predictors in a multiple regression equation suggested a sample size of 68.  
Results 
Data Analysis 
 Data were inspected in SPSS Statistics (version 21). Tests of skewness and 
kurtosis were conducted on all variables prior to their inclusion in analyses. Because 
many variables exhibited significant departures from normality, all regression, mediation, 
and latent growth analyses were conducted in Mplus 7 for Macintosh (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2012) using the MLR estimator (maximum likelihood estimation with robust 
standard errors). Missing data were accommodated using direct maximum likelihood 
(MLR). 
 Goodness of fit of latent growth models (LGMs) was evaluated using the root 
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mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% confidence interval and test 
of close fit (CFit), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Acceptable model fit was defined in 
part by the criteria described by Hu and Bentler (1999): RMSEA values ≤ .06 (90% CI 
upper limit close to .06, nonsignificant CFit), CFI and TLI values ≥ .95, and SRMR 
values ≤ .08. Model fit was further evaluated by the presence/absence of salient localized 
areas of strains in the solutions (e.g., modification indices), and the strength and 
interpretability of the parameter estimates. 
Characteristics of the MouselabWEB Task 
 A summary of parameters measured by the MouselabWEB task is presented in 
Table 3. Participants’ ratings of the MouselabWEB scenarios were examined to 
determine if the scenarios adequately simulated real-life decision-making. Mean 
similarity ratings assigned to the scenarios ranged from 1 (very different from a real-life 
decision) to 5 (very similar to a real-life decision). Similarity ratings on individual 
scenarios ranged from 3.29 (SD = 1.24) for the scenario about choosing between three 
jobs to 4.07 (SD = 1.13) for the scenario requiring participants to decide which project to 
work on next. 
 The choice options presented in the decision scenarios were intended to be 
equivalent, with no clear “correct” or superior choice. However, in five of the nine 
scenarios, the majority of participants selected the same choice option. Bias toward a 
particular choice was most evident on a scenario requiring participants to choose from 
among three computers, with 93.2% of participants selecting the same option.  
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 The mean difficulty rating participants assigned to the decision scenarios ranged 
from scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult). Mean difficulty ratings ranged from 
1.70 (SD =1.00) on the computer scenario to 2.71 (SD = 1.21) on the car scenario. There 
was a significant, positive correlation between mean similarity ratings and mean 
difficulty ratings (.34, p < .01) and a significant positive correlation between mean 
difficulty ratings and total time spent on the task (.42, p < .01).  
Neuropsychological Test Performance 
The sample, as a whole, performed well above average on WAIS subtests (Table 
3). When participants’ raw scores were compared to age-adjusted norms, 73% (n = 54) of 
the sample scored in the 50
th
 percentile or higher on Digit Symbol Coding, 95.9% (n = 
71) scored in the 50
th
 percentile or higher on Vocabulary, and 93.2% (n = 69) scored in 
the 50
th
 percentile or higher on Matrix Reasoning.  
Results Related to Indecisiveness 
Hypothesis 1: Relationship Between Psychopathology and Self-Reported Indecisiveness 
 Total IS scores were regressed onto BDI-II, PSWQ, and OCI-R scores. The 
overall model was significant, accounting for 25.4% of the variance in IS scores (z = 
3.08, p < .01), with self-reported depression (B = .38, t = 2.94 p < .01) and OCD 
symptoms (B = .33, t = 2.83, p < .01) contributing significantly to the model. Self-
reported worry (B = .03, t = .18, p = .86) did not significantly predict indecisiveness 
while controlling for the effects of depression and OCD symptoms.  
Because most previous studies of the association of decision-making with anxiety 
and/or mood disorders have used diagnosis as a unit of analysis, the analysis was rerun 
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using diagnostic status as predictors. Patients were coded as having depression if they 
received a clinical diagnosis (CSR ≥ 4) of MDD or MDD in partial remission, dysthymic 
disorder, or depressive disorder not otherwise specified during their diagnostic 
evaluation. Although the path between depression and IS scores was significant and in 
the predicted direction, B = 6.58, t = 2.43, p < .05, the overall model was not significant, 
R
2
 = .07, z = 1.31, p = .20.  
Hypothesis 2: Relationship Between Psychopathology and Behavioral Markers of 
Indecisiveness 
 The next set of analyses examined the association between self-reported 
psychopathology (depression, OCD symptoms, and worry) and two markers of 
indecisiveness, decision time and perceived decision difficulty. The first equation, in 
which decision time on the MouselabWEB task was regressed on BDI-II, OCD-R, and 
PSWQ scores was nonsignificant, R
2
 = .03, z = .76, p = .45. The second, in which total 
time on the IGT was the outcome, was also nonsignificant, R
2
 = .02, z = .44, p = .66. The 
third model, in which mean initiation time on the SOC, was regressed on BDI-II, OCI-R, 
and PSWQ scores, was nonsignficant, R
2
 = .01, z = .56, p = .58. The fourth model, in 
which mean difficulty ratings on the MouselabWEB scenarios were regressed on BDI-II, 
OCI-R, and PSWQ scores, was significant, accounting for 15.3% of the variance in 
difficulty ratings, z = 2.01, p < .05.  The relationship between self-reported depression 
and difficulty ratings was significant, B = .02, t = 2.91, p < .01. Self-reported worry (B = 
.00, t = .42, p = .68) and OCD symptoms (B = .01, t = 1.44, p = .15) did not significantly 
contribute to the variance in difficulty ratings. When the above regression analyses were 
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repeated using diagnostic status as predictors, all models were nonsignificant (ps ranging 
from .11 to .94).  
Hypothesis 3: Processing Speed as a Mediator of the Relationship Between 
Psychopathology and Decision Time 
 There were no significant direct relationships between self-reported 
psychopathology and decision time, indicating that traditional conditions for mediation 
were not met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Per the recommendations of Hayes (2009), 
however, mediation analyses were still conducted. Just-identified models were specified 
that allowed for significance testing of indirect effects on decision time. In the first model 
(Figure 1), Digit Symbol Coding was tested as mediator of the relationship between self-
reported psychopathology (BDI-II, PSWQ, and OCI-R) and decision time on the 
MouselabWEB task. The model did not account for significant variance in 
MouselabWEB decision time (R
2
 = .05, z = .91, p = .36). None of the direct paths from 
the psychopathology variables to decision time were significant (ps ranging from .15 to 
.95). The indirect paths from the psychopathology variables to decision time were also 
nonsignificant (ps ranging from .95 to .97), indicating that processing speed did not 
mediate the relationship between self-reported psychopathology and decision time on the 
MouselabWEB task. A second model was specified in which decision time on the IGT 
was the outcome. This model did not account for significant variance in total time spent 
on the IGT (R
2
 = .01, z = .46, p = .65). No significant direct effects were observed 
between psychopathology and decision time (ps ranging from .50 to .71). All indirect 
paths between psychopathology and IGT decision time were nonsignificant (ps ranged 
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from .73 to .89), indicating that processing speed did not mediate the relationship 
between psychopathology and IGT decision time.  
Hypothesis 4: Self-Reported Indecisiveness as a Mediator of the Relationship Between 
Psychopathology and Functional Impairment 
 A just-identified path model was specified to test the hypothesis that self-reported 
indecisiveness partially mediated the relationship between self-reported psychopathology 
and functional impairment (Figure 2). Although the model accounted for significant 
variance in SSS scores, R
2 
= .25, z = 3.00, p < .01, only the direct path between BDI-II 
and SSS was significant, B = .07, t = 3.08, p < .01. None of the indirect paths between 
psychopathology and functional impairment were significant (ps ranged from .43 to .84), 
indicating that self-reported indecisiveness did not mediate the relationship between 
psychopathology and functional impairment.  
Results Related to Decision-Making Under Risk 
Hypothesis 1: Psychopathology as Predictors of IGT Performance 
 Total net scores were regressed onto BDI-II, OCI-R, and PSWQ scores to 
determine the effect of self-reported depression, OCD symptoms, and worry on overall 
IGT performance. The equation was not significant, R
2 
= .05, z = .88, p = .38. The model 
was rerun using categorical diagnoses as predictors. Although the path from GAD to total 
net score was significant, B = -18.32, t = -2.65, p < .01, the overall equation was not,  
R
2 
= .10, z = 1.56, p = .12.
2
 
                                                 
2
 Given the unusually high proportion of left-handed participants in the sample—16.2% 
versus 10% in the general population (Gilbert & Wysocki, 1992)—handedness was 
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Given evidence that initial blocks on the IGT might assess a different type of 
decision making than later blocks (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006), exploratory regression 
analyses were conducted for which Blocks 1 and 2 were summed to create a Phase 1 
score and scores from Blocks 3 through 5 were summed to create a Phase 2 score. Phase 
1 scores were regressed on BDI-II, OCI-R, and PSWQ scores. The model was 
nonsignificant, accounting for 5.0% of the variance in Phase 1 scores, z = 1.20, p = .23. 
Next, Phase 2 scores were regressed on self-report measures of psychopathology. This 
model was also nonsignificant, accounting for 4.1% of the variance in Phase 2 scores, z = 
.88, p = .38. When the models were rerun with categorical diagnoses as predictors, the 
variance accounted for in IGT Phase 1 scores remained nonsignificant, R
2 
= .04, z = 1.00, 
p = .32, whereas a trend was evident in Phase 2 scores, R
2 
= .13, z = 1.86, p = .06. The 
path between GAD and IGT performance was significant, B = -15.51, t = -2.64, p < .01, 
indicating that a GAD diagnosis was associated with significantly worse IGT 
performance in Blocks 3 through 5, controlling for comorbid depression and OCD. 
                                                                                                                                                 
considered for inclusion as a covariate in analyses involving neuropsychological 
measures. When relevant predictors and outcome variables (Digit Symbol Coding, Trails 
B, number of perfect solutions on the SOC, and overall IGT performance) were regressed 
onto handedness, the associations were not significant. Consequently, handedness was 
not included in the analyses. Age was also not originally included as a covariate. 
However, there is a large literature documenting age-related decline in processing speed 
(e.g., Salthouse, 1996) and several studies have demonstrated a relationship between age 
and decision-making on the IGT (e.g., Fein, McGillivray, & Finn, 2007). In the current 
sample, there were significant zero-order correlations between age and Digit Symbol 
Coding, Trails B, and total time spent on the IGT. When added as a covariate to models 
predicting markers of indecisiveness (decision time and perceived decision difficulty) and 
IGT performance, age was not significantly associated with the outcomes, nor did its 
inclusion alter the significance of the relationships between other predictors and 
outcomes.   
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Hypothesis 2: Executive Functioning as a Mediator of the Relationship Between 
Psychopathology and IGT Performance 
 Just-identified path models were specified to test the hypothesis that executive 
functioning mediated the relationship between psychopathology and overall IGT 
performance. In the first model, self-reported psychopathology (BDI-II, OCI-R, and 
PSWQ scores) were exogenous variables, Trails B and the number of perfect solutions on 
the SOC were mediators, and total net score on the IGT was the outcome. Direct paths 
were specified from the three psychopathology variables to all other variables, and from 
the mediators to the IGT net total score. Indirect effects were estimated from the 
psychopathology variables to IGT net total score via each of the mediators. The model 
did not account for significant variance in IGT net total scores, R
2
 = .14, z = 1.80, p = .07. 
The only significant direct effect was between the SOC variable and IGT net total score, 
B = 5.29, t = 2.89, p < .01, indicating that a one-point increase in planning ability on the 
SOC was associated with a 5.29-point increase in IGT net score, holding constant scores 
on the BDI-II, OCI-R, PSWQ, and Trails B. No significant indirect effects were observed 
between psychopathology and IGT net total score (ps ranged from .26 to .99), indicating 
that the executive functioning variables did not mediate the relationship between 
psychopathology and overall IGT performance.   
 When categorical diagnoses were included in the model instead of dimensional 
self-report measures, the model accounted for significant variance in IGT net total scores, 
R
2
 = .17, z = 2.10, p < .05. As in the previous model, the path between the SOC variable 
and IGT net total scores was significant, B = 4.68 t = 2.60, p < .01. In addition, the direct 
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path between GAD and IGT net total scores was significant, B = -15.59, t = -2.34, p < 
.05. No significant indirect effects were observed between the categorical diagnoses and 
IGT net total score (ps ranged from .24 to .99), indicating that executive functioning did 
not mediate the relationship between categorical diagnoses and overall IGT performance. 
 Exploratory regression analyses were used to examine predictors of Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 IGT net scores, this time including the two measures of executive functioning. 
When Phase 1 scores were regressed on the three categorical diagnoses, the SOC 
variable, and Trails B, the equation was not significant, R
2
 = .10, z = 1.53, p = .13. When 
Phase 2 scores were regressed on the five predictors, the equation was significant, R
2
 = 
.23, z = 2.73, p < .01. GAD was significantly and negatively related to Phase 2 IGT 
scores, B = -13.48, t = -2.45, p < .05. The number of perfect solutions on the SOC was 
significantly and positively related to Phase 2 IGT scores, B = 4.12, t = 2.71, p < .01. 
Hypothesis 3: Predictors of Trajectory of IGT Performance 
 To examine performance on the IGT over the course of five blocks of trials, an 
unconditional LGM was specified. Participants’ performance on the IGT was 
characterized by a nonlinear improvement in scores over the course of the task (Figure 3). 
Consequently, a nonlinear slope from Block 1 through Block 5 was estimated in the 
unconditional LGM. The Slope factor loadings were specified as follows for Blocks 1 
through Block 5, respectively: 0, *, *, *, 1 (* = freely estimated). Intercepts of IGT 
performance were fixed to zero. To improve model fit, correlated residual variances were 
specified between Blocks 2 through 5. Fit indices suggested good fit, χ2(4) = 81.29, p < 
.001, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = 0.00 (90% CI = 0.00 to 0.14, CFit =.72), TLI = 1.05, CFI 
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= 1.00.  The unstandardized mean of the Intercept factor was -2.29 (SE = .86, p = .25). 
The variance of the Intercept factor (22.32) was not significant (p = .49), indicating that 
there was little individual variability in scores on Block 1. The covariance between the 
Slope and Intercept factors was nonsignificant (p = .44), indicating that performance 
during Block 1 did not predict overall change in scores over the course of the task. The 
unstandardized mean of the Slope factor was 9.24 (SE = 1.51, p < .005), indicating that 
the average change in IGT score across five blocks was 9.24 points. The significant 
variance in the Slope factor (84.27; p < .05) indicates considerable individual variability 
in performance trajectories on the IGT.  
 An initial conditional LGM with three covariates (categorical variables 
representing the presence or absence of depression, GAD, and OCD) was specified to 
determine whether psychopathology contributed to individual variability in Slope. Fit 
indices were consistent with good model fit, χ2(25) = 122.21, p < .001, SRMR = .04, 
RMSEA = 0.00 (90% CI = 0.00 to 0.09, CFit =.80), TLI = 1.05, CFI = 1.00. The path 
from GAD to Slope was significant (unstandardized γ = -6.40; p < .05), indicating that 
the presence of GAD was associated with significantly less improvement in IGT 
performance across Blocks 1 through 5. The path from OCD to Slope was also significant 
(unstandardized γ  = 7.89; p < .05), indicating that the presence of OCD was associated 
with significantly more change (i.e., greater improvement) in IGT performance over the 
course of the task. The path between depression and Slope was not significant. Although 
the model accounted for 26.8% of the variability in the Slope factor, the R
2
 value was not 
significant (p = .11).  
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To test the hypothesis that both psychopathology (the presence of depression, 
GAD, and OCD) and executive functioning (Trails B and the number of perfect solutions 
on the SOC) contributed to individual variability in Slope, a model with five covariates 
was specified (Figure 4). Fit indices suggested good model fit, χ2(35) = 145.90, p < .001, 
SRMR = .05, RMSEA = 0.00 (90% CI = 0.00 to 0.09, CFit =.75), TLI = 1.03, CFI = 
1.00. Collectively, the covariates accounted for 48.2% (p < .01) of the variance in Slope. 
As in the previous model, the paths between GAD and Slope (unstandardized γ = -6.46, 
respectively; p < .05) and OCD and Slope were significant (unstandardized γ = 6.47; p < 
.05). The path between depression and Slope was nonsignificant (unstandardized γ = -
6.46; p = .16). Trails B was significantly negatively associated with the Slope factor 
(unstandardized γ = -.17; p < .05), indicating that an increase in Trails B score (i.e., worse 
set-shifting) was associated with less improvement on the IGT. The path between the 
SOC variable and the Slope factor was nonsignificant (unstandardized γ = .85; p = .27). 
Additional Exploratory Analyses  
 To further explore the validity of the IS, Pearson correlations were calculated 
between IS scores and putative markers of indecisiveness. There were significant 
bivariate relationships between IS scores and difficulty ratings (r = .38, p < .01) and 
decision time (r = .39, p < .01) on the MouselabWEB task. The correlation between IS 
scores and decision time on the IGT was not significant (r = .10, p = .41). 
 Given the paucity of evidence for an association between IGT performance and 
functional impairment, a Pearson correlation was calculated between the net total score 
on the IGT and the SSS. The correlation was nonsignificant (r = -.14, p = .24).  
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 All participants completed the BIS-11, a self-report measure of impulsivity. 
Pearson correlations between the BIS-11 and measures of indecisiveness and risky 
decision-making were examined to determine if self-reported impulsivity was 
differentially related to the two types of decision-making impairments. No significant 
zero-order correlations were found between the BIS-11 and decision time on the 
MouselabWEB task (r = .03, p = .82), decision time on the IGT (r = -.11, p = 37), mean 
initiation time on the SOC (r = -.11, p = .35), or net total score on the IGT (r = .20, p = 
.37).  
Discussion 
Overview of Findings 
 The aims of the current study were to characterize decision-making impairment in 
a clinical sample of patients with anxiety and/or unipolar mood disorders. The study 
focused on two types of impairment identified in the literature, indecisiveness and risky 
decision-making, and their relationship to psychopathology (unipolar depression, OCD, 
and GAD/worry) and neuropsychological variables (processing speed and executive 
functioning). Self-reported depression and OCD symptoms were significantly and 
positively associated with self-reported indecisiveness, while controlling for the effect of 
worry. Contrary to prediction, neither psychopathology nor processing speed was 
significantly associated with decision time, a behavioral marker of indecisiveness, on the 
IGT or the experimenter-designed decision-making task. Self-reported depression did, 
however, predict ratings of decision difficulty on the experimenter-designed decision-
making task while controlling for the effects of worry and OCD symptoms.   
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 Neither self-reported psychopathology nor categorical diagnoses significantly 
predicted overall performance on the IGT, as measured by the net total score (i.e., the 
total number of disadvantageous card selections subtracted from the total number of 
advantageous selections). When two measures of executive functioning, Trails B and the 
total number of perfect solutions on the SOC, were included in a regression equation with 
categorical diagnoses (depression, GAD, and OCD), the model significantly predicted net 
total scores on the IGT. An LGM estimating the effects of these predictors on 
performance over the course of the IGT indicated that the presence of GAD was 
associated with significantly less improvement in IGT net scores over five blocks of 
trials, whereas the presence of OCD was associated with significantly more improvement 
in IGT in in net scores. Trails B performance was also significantly associated with IGT 
performance, such that an increase in time spent on Trails B (indicative of poorer set 
shifting) was associated with less improvement in IGT performance over the course of 
the task. 
Indecisiveness and Psychopathology 
 The current study was the first to examine the association between multiple forms 
of psychopathology and self-reported indecisiveness on the IS in a clinical sample. The 
finding that self-reported depression and OCD symptoms are uniquely associated with IS 
scores is consistent with the inclusion of indecisiveness in the DSM definition of MDD 
and dysthymia (currently persistent depressive disorder) and clinical and empirical 
literature associating indecisiveness with OCD (Frost & Shows, 1993; Reed, 1976). 
Similar to Frost and Shows' (1993) finding that self-reported indecisiveness was 
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positively correlated with decision latency on a behavioral task, IS scores were 
significantly and positively correlated with decision time on the MouselabWEB task. IS 
scores were not, however, significantly associated with total decision time on the IGT. 
Previous studies of IGT performance have rarely examined decision time as an outcome, 
though at least one study reported longer deliberation times among patients with unipolar 
and bipolar depression than in control participants (Murphy et al., 2001). The positive 
association between IS scores and decision time on the MouselabWEB task is perhaps 
not surprising given that both are face valid tasks of decision-making difficulty covering 
similar content areas.   
 A novel, experimenter-designed decision-making task was used in the current 
study to assess markers of indecisiveness. Although MouselabWEB software offers a 
promising alternative to similar, experimenter-administered tasks (e.g., Isen & Means, 
1983), the current study suggests several modifications to the task. In the current study, 
no association was observed between psychopathology and decision time on the 
MouselabWEB task, or between measures of processing speed and decision time. These 
findings may indicate that the task was insufficiently demanding, a hypothesis supported 
by the low difficulty ratings assigned to some of the decision scenarios. Furthermore, the 
decision scenarios may not have adequately simulated the real-life decisions with which 
patients struggle. Although the similarity ratings suggest the scenarios were reasonable 
approximations of real-life decisions, the majority described consumer choices (e.g., what 
camera to buy). The inclusion of more scenarios focused on interpersonal scenarios or 
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higher-stakes choices may have produced more emotional arousal and longer deliberation 
times.  
 The study of indecisiveness is, as mentioned previously, complicated by varying 
definitions of the construct and a corresponding lack of well-validated measures. The 
field would benefit from research clarifying nature of the construct (i.e., is it a stable trait 
that precedes the onset of an Axis I disorder and persists after the remission of that 
disorder, or a correlate of psychopathology?). Greater clarity in the definition of the 
indecisiveness would promote hypothesis-testing about indecisiveness’s relationship with 
psychopathology (Potworowski, 2010; Rassin, 2007). 
Decision-Making Under Risk and Psychopathology   
In the current study, GAD and OCD diagnoses, but not depression, predicted the 
trajectory of participants’ performance over the course of the IGT, with GAD associated 
with a negative effect on task performance, and OCD associated with a positive effect. 
Although prior research linking anxiety and unipolar mood diagnoses to IGT 
performance have been inconsistent, this finding was somewhat contrary to expectation. 
Given the risk aversion typically found among anxious patients, the differential effects of 
GAD and OCD are puzzling. Control participants’ net scores on the IGT are typically 
characterized by a steep, positive slope over initial blocks, followed by a relatively flat 
trajectory over the remaining blocks (Lawrence et al., 2006; Starcke et al., 2010). This 
pattern indicates that respondents are learning the rules of the task during the initial 
blocks, and selectively avoiding risky card selections during the latter blocks. The sample 
in the current study displayed a similar pattern. Results of the LGM suggest, however, 
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that the presence of GAD impeded performance, whereas OCD may have facilitated 
learning of the task’s risk and reward contingencies.  
Previous studies of IGT performance in patients with OCD have produced 
conflicting results. Starcke et al. (2010) et al. found that patients with OCD exhibited 
impaired overall IGT performance (i.e., lower total net scores) relative to normal 
controls. When performance was analyzed by block, patients with OCD underperformed 
relative to normal controls only on Blocks 3 and 5, suggesting that, despite appearing to 
learn the rules of the task over the initial blocks, they were unable to maintain their 
performance over the course of the task. In contrast, Lawrence et al. (2006) found that 
individuals with non-hoarding OCD displayed comparable performance to normal 
participants on the IGT. The only other study to assess the influence of GAD on IGT 
performance found that individuals meeting criteria for GAD (based on a self-report 
measure of GAD symptoms) outperformed normal controls, as indicated by a higher 
number of advantageous card selections and a steeper learning curve (Mueller et al., 
2010). Of note, the studies described above did not control for the influence of comorbid 
depression or other anxiety disorders on IGT performance.  
The results of the current study may be understood in light of the literature linking 
GAD to difficulty tolerating ambiguity and uncertainty (Hock, Krohne, & Kaiser, 1996; 
Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997). Tallis and Eysenck (1994) proposed that worry may 
lead to an unfocused attentional style and impaired problem solving, particular in 
ambiguous situations. In fact, high levels of worry are associated with slower 
categorization of ambiguous stimuli (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990) 
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and a tendency to view problems as unsolvable (Ladouceur et al., 1998). Although the 
IGT was designed as a test of risky decision-making (Bechara et al., 1994), some have 
argued that it is more accurately characterized as a test of decision-making under 
ambiguity, given that respondents are not informed of the rules of the task (Dunn et al., 
2006). Thus, patients with GAD may be particularly susceptible to underperformance on 
the IGT, as opposed to a gambling task in which the risks and rewards associated with 
each card selection are explicit (e.g., Rogers et al., 1999). Researchers have proposed 
alternate scoring systems that acknowledge that performance on initial blocks may reflect 
a different type of decision-making process than later blocks, by which time most 
respondents have determined which decks of cards are riskiest (e.g., Dunn et al, 2006; 
Gansler, Jerram, Vonnorsdall, & Schretien, 2011a). One might expect the presence of 
GAD to exert a particularly negative influence on performance in the first two blocks of 
the IGT, during which the rules of the task are most ambiguous. The specification of the 
LGM did not allow for comparison of performance trajectories over the first two blocks 
to performance on the latter three blocks. However, regression analyses predicting 
performance during Phase 1 (Blocks 1 and 2) and Phase 2 (Blocks 3 through 5) indicated 
that the presence of GAD significantly predicted poor performance only in Phase 2. 
These results may suggest that individuals with GAD display normal exploratory 
behavior during these first few blocks of the IGT but, due to difficulty tolerating 
ambiguity and/or deficits in problem solving, do not learn the contingencies of the task 
well enough to achieve stable, advantageous (i.e., risk averse) performance in the latter 
blocks.  
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As indicated above, the finding that OCD was associated with greater change (i.e., 
improved performance) over the course of the IGT is not entirely inconsistent with 
previous findings (which have variously suggested that OCD is associated with impaired 
or enhanced performance on the IGT). There is some evidence that patients with OCD 
demonstrate an enhanced negative learning bias, such that they learn faster from negative 
outcomes than from positive ones, whereas the opposite pattern is evident in control 
participants (Endrass, Kloft, Kaufmann, & Kathmann, 2010). One might speculate that 
individuals with OCD are particularly attuned to large losses on the IGT and 
consequently learn to avoid disadvantageous decks faster than other respondents.  
Of note, there is some evidence that risk-taking in the context of anxiety disorders 
may be associated with treatment-seeking behavior and positive treatment response 
(Lorian & Grisham, 2011; Lorian Titov, & Grisham, 2012). Although the IGT is based on 
the assumption that risk aversion is advantageous and risk-taking is disadvantageous, 
there is, as discussed further below, little evidence of an association between poor 
performance on the IGT and real-world functional impairment. In a population 
characterized by pathological risk aversion, evidence of “disadvantageous” performance 
on the IGT might, in fact, be suggestive of healthy functioning.  
Decision-Making and Neuropsychological Performance 
 The current study proposed that neuropsychological test performance partially 
mediated the relationship between psychopathology and decision-making. The mediation 
hypotheses were not supported and, contrary to expectation, no-zero order relationships 
were observed between psychopathology and decision time, or between psychopathology 
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and processing speed, despite a large literature linking depression to psychomotor 
slowing (Sobin & Sackeim, 1997). This failure to find a relationship may be due to the 
relatively mild levels of depression represented in the sample (McDermott & Ebmeier, 
2009). Furthermore, there is evidence that processing speed may be preserved even in the 
presence of other cognitive deficits in individuals similar in age to participants in the 
current study (Grant et al., 2001; Porter, Gallagher, Thompson, & Young, 2003).  
 The relationship between the IGT and other measures of neuropsychological 
performance has been the subject of debate, with Toplak et al. (2010) arguing that 
evidence for an association between IGT performance and executive functioning 
measures is weak. In the current study, measures of planning (number of perfect solutions 
on the SOC) and set-shifting (Trails B) predicted overall performance, as measured by 
total net score, whereas only Trails B significantly predicted change in performance over 
the course of the task. Trails B is typically described as a measure of set shifting, or the 
ability to respond flexibly to changes in rules or schedules of reinforcement, whereas the 
SOC is regarded as a measure of planning and/or spatial problem-solving. Both tasks 
have been broadly associated with activation in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), with some 
evidence specifically implicating the dorsolateral PFC (Kaller, Rahm, Spreer, Weiller, & 
Unterrainer, 2010; Schall et al., 2003; Stuss, Bisschop, Alexander, Levine, Katz, & 
Izukawa, 2001; Zakzanis, Mraz, & Graham, 2005). The association of these tasks with 
IGT performance in the current study likely reflects their association with proximal or 
overlapping brain regions. Designed as measure of VM functioning, the IGT is often 
regarded as a measure of more broad-based frontal-executive functioning, as the area 
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Bechara, Damasio, et al. (2000) define as the VM includes parts of the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex and communicates with multiple other brain areas (Dunn et al., 
2006).  
Over the last several years, multiple researchers have questioned the construct 
validity of both the IGT and the somatic marker hypothesis, suggesting that the IGT may 
not be accurately described as a measure of executive functioning (Dunn et al., 2006; 
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2013). Of note, a recent 
large-scale study of adults without any known neurologic dysfunction found that 
measures of simple attention (e.g., Digit Span) contributed more strongly to overall IGT 
performance than did measures of executive functioning (e.g., the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task). Consistent with the finding from this study that measures of executive 
functioning predicted Phase 2 (Blocks 3-5) scores, but not Phase 1 (Blocks 1-2) scores in 
regression analyses, executive functioning was most robustly related to IGT performance 
on later blocks (Gansler, Jerram, Vannorsdall, & Schretien, 2011b). These results reflect 
the growing consensus that the IGT is not a uniform measure of risky decision making 
and that performance on earlier blocks may be served by different brain regions than later 
blocks (Dunn et al., 2006).   
Decision-Making and Functional Impairment 
In the current study, there were no significant associations, direct or indirect, 
between decision-making task performance and self-reported functional impairment. The 
failure to find an association in the current study may have been due to a number of 
factors, including the use of a very brief measure of functional impairment, and the fact 
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that participants were highly educated, relatively high-functioning, and above average on 
measures of intellectual ability. Surprisingly few studies have attempted to link 
behavioral decision-making tasks to real-world functional impairments (Cunha, Bechara, 
de Andrade, & Nicastri, 2011). Although the IGT has been tested on clinical samples 
with demonstrable functional impairment, it is unclear if this impairment is specifically 
associated with decision-making on the IGT. Of note, there is considerable variability 
even among control participants in IGT performance, with multiple studies finding that 
over 30% of “healthy controls” exhibit impairment (i.e., make over 50% of their 
selections from disadvantageous decks, comparable to the level observed in VM patients) 
(Steingroever et al., 2013). In fact, in the current study of highly educated, high-
functioning outpatients, overall performance on the IGT varied widely, with T scores 
ranging from 24 (< 1
st
 percentile) to 67 (96
th
 percentile) (Bechara, 2007). Over one-
quarter of the sample (28.4%; n = 21) performed in the range expected of VM patients. 
Presumably not all individuals who exhibit markedly impaired performance on the IGT 
display the “acquired sociopathy” described in patients with VM damage (Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1990). Establishing a link between laboratory gambling tasks and 
real-life decision-making is particularly important given that these tasks are being used in 
a variety of clinical samples, many with little phenotypic resemblance to the patients for 
whom they were originally created.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Contrary to hypotheses, depression did not emerge as a significant predictor of 
either decision time on the MouselabWEB task or risk taking on the IGT. Results of the 
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current study may have been affected by the relatively low proportion of patients 
diagnosed with a depressive disorder. In the final sample (N = 74), 20 participants 
received a clinical diagnosis of depression. Of these 20, 16 received a diagnosis of mild 
or moderate MDD, three exhibited subthreshold yet clinically significant symptoms of 
depression (and received diagnoses of MDD in partial remission or depressive disorder 
NOS), and one was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder. The sample did not include any 
participants with severe depression (as indicated by the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic specifier) 
and therefore may not have included an adequate range of depression severity. Some 
previous studies demonstrating significant effects of depression on decision-making have 
included more severely depressed patients (Murphy et al., 2001) or mood inductions that 
may have made depressive symptoms more salient to participants (van Randenborgh et 
al., 2010). The current sample’s scores on the BDI-II, which ranged from 1 to 47, suggest 
that an adequate range of depression was represented. However, only four participants 
fell within the range of scores associated with “severe depression” (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996). Of note, the mean PSWQ score observed in the in the current study 
(62.62) was within the range reported in other studies of clinical mood and anxiety 
disorder patients (Brown, 2003; Fresco, Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2003), whereas the 
mean OCI-R score (14.45) was lower than that reported in other clinical samples (Foa et 
al., 2002; Huppert et al., 2007).  
The small sample size of the current study may have limited the power to detect 
significant relationships between variables, as well as analytic approaches used to test 
hypotheses. Future studies of decision-making in individuals with anxiety and mood 
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disorders would benefit from the use of latent variables to represent disorder constructs. 
The current study used self-report measures of disorder symptoms or categorical 
diagnoses as independent variables. The former approach acknowledged the dimensional 
nature of disorder features and avoided the negative statistical consequences of 
dichotomizing continuous variables (see Brown & Barlow, 2005), whereas the latter 
approach allowed for more direct comparison of results with previous decision-making 
studies, which have typically used diagnostic status as a unit of analysis. However, the 
alternating use of self-report measures of psychopathology and diagnostic status as 
predictors in the current study led to results that were occasionally inconsistent and 
therefore difficult to interpret. The use of dimensional symptom measures and 
consideration of the effects of comorbidity on task performance may represent advances 
in the nascent field of decision-making in the context of anxiety and mood disorders. A 
more sophisticated approach, however, would be to use multiple indictors of latent 
disorder factors, and to integrate these factors into structural equation models of the 
hypothesized relationships between disorder constructs, decision-making, and various 
mediators, moderators, and covariates.  
Summary 
The current study contributes to decision science by examining two types of 
decision-making impairment in a mixed clinical sample, and attempting to clarify the 
contribution of psychopathology and cognitive functioning to decision task performance. 
The literatures on indecisiveness and risky decision-making have remained largely 
separate, despite evidence that both types of decision-making impairment are relevant to 
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our understanding of psychopathology. The current study was an attempt to integrate 
these distinct literatures and examine decision-making impairment as multidimensional 
construct.   
 65  
 
Table 1 
Current Axis I Diagnoses (N = 74) 
Diagnosis 
Principal or 
Co-Principal Additional 
 n % n % 
Adjustment disorder 0 0 1 1.4 
Anxiety disorder not otherwise specified 1 1.4 1 1.4 
Depressive disorder not otherwise specified 0 0 1 1.4 
Dysthymic disorder 0 0 1 1.4 
Eating disorder not otherwise specified 0 0 1 1.4 
Generalized anxiety disorder 22 29.7 14 18.9 
Major depressive disorder 9 12.5 9 12.2 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder 5 6.8 6 8.1 
Panic disorder with or without agoraphobia 17 23.0 8 10.8 
Posttraumatic stress disorder 1 1.4 1 1.4 
Social phobia 26 35.1 19 25.7 
Specific phobia 1 1.4 4 5.4 
Trichotillomania 1 1.4 0 0 
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Table 2 
 
Sample Demographic Characteristics (N = 74) 
Female (%) 59.5 
Age (years): M (SD), Range 31.8 (13.5), 18 – 70  
Race (%)  
     Asian/Pacific Islander 10.6 
     Black or African American 6.8 
     White or Caucasian 78.4 
     Other 2.7 
     Multiracial 2.7 
Ethnicity (%)  
Hispanic or Latino 8.1 
Highest Level of Education (%)  
     Some high school 1.4 
     High school degree 2.7 
     Some college 28.4 
     Two-year degree 1.4 
     Four-year degree 41.9 
     Graduate Degree 24.3 
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Table 3 
 
Performance on Neuropsychological and Decision-Making Tasks 
Test M (SD) 
Trails A (seconds) 27.31 (7.99)  
Trails B (seconds) 60.64 (21.33)  
WAIS-III subtests  
Digit Symbol Coding 83.51 (13.74) 
Matrix Reasoning 20.15 (3.60) 
Vocabulary 52.77 (6.69) 
SOC  
         Number of perfect solutions 8.43 (1.81) 
         Initiation time (milliseconds) 6628.80 (536.62) 
IGT  
Net total score 21.92 (3.67) 
Total time (milliseconds) 109258.97 (58157.42) 
Card selections  
     Deck A 12.59 (5.60) 
     Deck B 26.34 (13.40) 
     Deck C 22.56 (12.32) 
     Deck D 38.49 (15.14) 
MouselabWEB task  
(decision time and ratings averaged across decision scenarios) 
 
              Decision time (milliseconds) 32963.49 (12986.83) 
              Difficulty rating  2.39 (.61) 
              Similarity rating  3.63 (.63) 
Note. WAIS = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. SOC = Stockings of Cambridge. IGT = 
Iowa Gambling Task. Prior to inclusion in analyses, decision/initiation time variables 
were rescaled. 
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Table 4 
 
Self-Report Measures: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. BDI-II 1.00      
2. BIS-11 .13 1.00     
3. IS .41** .20 1.00    
4. OCI-R .25* .00 .38** 1.00   
5. PSWQ .42** .01 .32** .55** 1.00  
6. SSS .48** .16 .17 .31** .39** 1.00 
Mean 16.39 67.21 51.26 14.45 62.62 3.44 
SD 9.88 10.16 11.15 10.19 10.92 1.59 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Figure 1. Path diagram of direct and indirect relationships between self-reported 
psychopathology, processing speed, and decision time on the MouselabWEB decision-
making task. Correlation coefficients and unstandardized regression coefficients are 
presented, with standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory—II. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. OCI-R = 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory—Revised. All indirect relationships between 
psychopathology and decision time via processing speed were nonsignificant.  
* p < .05 **p < .01 
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Figure 2. Path diagram of direct and indirect relationships between self-reported 
psychopathology, indecisiveness, and functional impairment. Correlation coefficients and 
unstandardized regression coefficients are presented, with standardized regression 
coefficients in parentheses. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory—II. PSWQ = Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire. OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory—Revised. IS = 
Indecisiveness Scale. SSS = Subjective Symptoms Scale. All indirect relationships 
between psychopathology and functional impairment via indecisiveness were 
nonsignificant.  
* p < .05 **p < .01 
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Figure 3. Performance of the full sample on the IGT. The net total is the total number of 
cards selected from disadvantageous decks (A and B) subtracted from the total number of 
cards selected from advantageous decks (C and D). Each of five blocks consisted of 20 
trials.   
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Figure 4. Conditional LGM with five covariates. DEP, OCD, GAD = categorical 
diagnoses representing the presence or absence of unipolar depression, OCD, and GAD, 
respectively. Trails B = total task completion time in seconds. SOC = total number of 
perfect solutions on the Stockings of Cambridge.  
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Appendix A 
 
Instructions for the Iowa Gambling Task 
 
 In front of you on the screen, there are 4 decks of cards, A, B, C, and D. I want 
you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you choose. Each 
time you select a card, the computer will tell you that won some money. I don’t know 
how much money you’ll win. You will find out as we go along. Every time you win, the 
green bar gets bigger. Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer 
tells you that you won some money, but then it says that you lost some money too. I don’t 
know when you will lose, or how much you will lose. You will find out as we go along. 
Every time you lose, the green bar gets smaller. You are absolutely free to switch from 
one deck to the other at any time, and as often as you wish. The goal of the game is to 
win as much money as possible, and if you can’t win, avoid losing money as much as 
possible. You won’t know when the game will end. You must keep on playing until the 
computer stops. I am going to give you this $2000 credit, the green bar, to start the game. 
The red bar here is a reminder of how much money you borrowed to play the game, and 
how much money you have to pay back before we see how much you won or lost. It is 
important to know that just like in a real card game, the computer does not change the 
order of the cards once the game starts. You may not be able to figure out exactly when 
you will lose money, but the game is fair. The computer does not make you lose money 
at random, or make you lose money based on the last card you picked. Also, each deck 
contains an equal number of cards of each color, so the color of the cards does not tell 
you which decks are better in this game. So you must not try to figure out what the 
computer is doing. All I can say is that some decks are worse than the others. You may 
find all of them bad, but are worse than the others. No matter how much you find 
yourself losing, you can still win if you stay away from the worst decks. Please treat the 
play money in this game as real money, and any decision on what to do with it should be 
made as if you were using your own money.  
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Appendix B 
Screen Shot of Iowa Gambling Task 
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Appendix C 
 
Screen Shot of MouselabWEB Task 
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Appendix D 
Decision Scenarios Included in MouselabWEB Task 
  
You’re buying a new computer. Which laptop would you buy? 
 Laptop A Laptop B Laptop C 
Memory 2 GB 2 GB 3 GB 
Hard Drive 120 GB 160 GB 259 GB 
Screen Size 15 in 18 in 14 in 
You’re planning to take a night course. Which one would you sign up for? 
 Course 1 Course 2 Course 3 
Time 5 PM 6 PM 6:30 PM 
Number of Assignments 3 4 4 
Number of Classes Per Week 2 3 2 
Cost $450 $375 $400 
 
You’re looking for a new job. Which would be your top choice? 
  Job 1 Job 2 Job 3 
Salary $65,000 $64,000 $70,000 
Commute 30 minutes 10 minutes  30 minutes  
Opportunities for Advancement High Moderate Moderate 
Parking Costs $100/month $75/month $150/month 
You’re opening a bank account. Which option would you choose? 
 Account 1 Account 2 Account 3 
Minimum Initial Deposit $25 $25 $500 
Minimum Monthly Balance $300 $100 $500 
Interest  .20% 1.54% 2.28% 
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You’re looking for a new apartment. Which one would you choose? 
 Apartment 1 Apartment 2 Apartment 3 
Noise Level Low Medium Medium 
Parking Street  Garage  Street  
Bedroom Size 12 x 12 ft 12 x 15 ft 10 x 13 ft 
Length of Commute 25 minutes 30 minutes 15 minutes 
Security Deposit? Yes No Yes 
You’re buying a used car. Which car would you choose? 
 Car 1 Car 2 Car 3 Car 4 
Miles per Gallon of Gas 23 34 34 32 
Model Year 2001 2003  2007 2005 
Miles 38,000 30,000 50,000 40,000 
You’re buying a digital camera. Which one would you choose?  
 Camera 1 Camera 2 Camera 3 
Megapixels 7.1 7.2 8 
Price $165 $150 $170 
Screen size 3 in 2.5 in 2 in 
Weight 4.4 oz 4.9 oz 5.5 oz 
Length of Zoom  396 mm  360 mm  432 mm  
You have several work projects to complete. Which one would you do first? 
 Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 
Difficulty Low High  Moderate 
Time Requirement 40 min 60 min 40 min 
Deadline In 2 days  In 2 days  In 3 days  
You and some friends are planning a social activity. What option would you 
choose? 
 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 
Approximate Length 4 hours 6 hours 3 hours 
Cost per person $20 $22 $30 
Number of friends invited 10 12 4 
 78  
 
References 
Aardema, F., & O'Connor, K. (2012). Dissolving the tenacity of obsessional doubt: 
Implications for treatment outcome. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 43(2), 855–861. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2011.12.006 
Abas, M. A., Sahakian, B. J., & Levy, R. (1990). Neuropsychological deficits and CT 
scan changes in elderly depressives. Psychological Medicine, 20(3), 507–520. doi: 
10.1017/S0033291700017025 
Abramowitz, J. S., & Foa, E. B. (1998). Worries and obsessions in individuals with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder with and without comorbid generalized anxiety 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36(7-8), 695–700. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(98)00058-8 
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (3
rd
 ed., rev.). Washington DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4
th
 ed.). Washington DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (5
th
 ed.). Washington DC: Author. 
Anderson, C. J. (2003). The psychology of doing nothing: Forms of decision avoidance 
result from reason and emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 139–166. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.139 
Andrews, G., Hobbs, M. J., Borkovec, T. D., Beesdo, K., Craske, M. G., Heimberg, R. 
G., et al. (2010). Generalized worry disorder: A review of DSM-IV generalized 
 79  
 
anxiety disorder and options for DSM-V. Depression and Anxiety, 27(2), 134–147. 
doi:10.1002/da.20658 
Antony, M. M., Purdon, C. L., Huta, V., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). Dimensions of 
perfectionism across the anxiety disorders. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36(12), 
1143–1154. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00083-7 
Barlow, D. H. (2004). Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and treatment of anxiety and 
panic. New York: Guilford. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in 
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173–1182. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.51.6.1173 
Barry, D., & Petry, N.M. (2007). Predictors of decision-making on the Iowa Gambling 
Task; Independent effects of lifetime history of substance use disorders and 
performance on the Trail Making Test. Brain and Cognition, 66(3), 243-252. 
doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2007.09.001 
Bechara, A. (2007). Iowa Gambling Task professional manual. Lutz, FL: Psychological 
Assessment Resources.  
Bechara, A., & Martin, E. M. (2004). Impaired decision-making related to working 
memory deficits in individuals with substance addictions. Neuropsychology, 18(1), 
152–162. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.18.1.152 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensitivity to 
future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50(1-
 80  
 
3), 7–15. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, decision making and the 
orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 295–307. doi: 10.1093/cercor/10.3.295 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997). Deciding 
advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy. Science, 275(5304), 
1293–1295. doi: 10.1126/science.275.5304.1293 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The Iowa Gambling 
Task and the somatic marker hypothesis: Some questions and answers. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 159–62. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.02.002 
Bechara, A., Dolan, S., Denburg, N., Hindes, A., Anderson, S. W., & Nathan, P. E. 
(2001). Decision-making deficits, linked to a dysfunctional ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, revealed in alcohol and stimulant abusers. Neuropsychologia, 39(4), 376–389. 
doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00136-6 
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (2000). Characterization of the decision-making 
deficit of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions. Brain, 123(11), 2189–
2202. doi: 10.1093/brain/123.11.2189 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression 
Inventory--II. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation.   
Bell, A. C., & D'Zurilla, T. J. (2009). Problem-solving therapy for depression: A meta-
analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 29(4), 348–353. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2009.02.003 
Bishara, A. J., Pleskac, T. J., Fridberg, D. J., Yechiam, E., Lucas, J., Busemeyer, J. R., . . 
. Stout, J.C. (2009). Similar processes despite divergent behavior in two commonly 
 81  
 
used measures of risky decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
22(4), 435–454. doi:10.1002/bdm.641 
Brand, M., Franke-Sievert, C., Jacoby, G. E., Markowitsch, H. J., & Tuschen-Caffier, B. 
(2007). Neuropsychological correlates of decision-making in patients with bulimia 
nervosa. Neuropsychology, 21(6), 742–750. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.21.6.742 
Brown, T. A., Antony, M. M., & Barlow, D. H. (1992). Psychometric properties of the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire in a clinical anxiety disorders sample. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 30(1), 33–37. 
Brown, T. A., & Barlow, D. H. (1995). Long-term outcome in cognitive-behavioral 
treatment of panic disorder: Clinical predictors and alternative strategies for 
assessment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 63(5), 754–765. doi: 
10.1037/0022-006X.63.5.754 
Brown, T. A., & Barlow, D. H. (2005). Dimensional versus categorical classification of 
mental disorders in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders and beyond: Comment on the special section. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 114(4), 551–556. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.114.4.551 
Brown, T. A., Campbell, L. A., Lehman, C. L., Grisham, J. R., & Mancill, R. B. (2001). 
Current and lifetime comorbidity of the DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders in a 
large clinical sample. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110(4), 585–599. 
doi:10.1037//0021-843X.110.4.585 
Brown, T. A., Chorpita, B. F., & Barlow, D. H. (1998). Structural relationships among 
dimensions of the DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders and dimensions of negative 
 82  
 
affect, positive affect, and autonomic arousal. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
107(2), 179–192. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.107.2.179 
Brown, T. A., Di Nardo, P. A., Lehman, C. L., & Campbell, L. A. (2001). Reliability of 
DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders: Implications for the classification of emotional 
disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110(1), 49–58. doi:10.1037//0021-
843X.110.1.49 
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2007). Individual differences in 
adult decision-making competence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
92(5), 938–956. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.938 
Burdick, K. E., Robinson, D. G., Malhotra, A. K., & Szeszko, P. R. (2008). 
Neurocognitive profile analysis in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 14(4), 640–645. 
doi:10.1017/S1355617708080727 
Burt, D. B., Zembar, M. J., & Niederehe, G. (1995). Depression and memory impairment: 
A meta-analysis of the association, its pattern, and specificity. Psychological 
Bulletin, 117(2), 285–305. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.117.2.285 
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1987). Anticipatory anxiety and risk perception. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 11(5), 551-565. doi: 10.1007/BF01183858 
Cambridge Cognition (1995). Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery 
(CANTAB) manual. Cambridge: Author. 
Castaneda, A. E., Tuulio-Henriksson, A., Marttunen, M., Suvisaari, J., & Lönnqvist, J. 
(2008). A review on cognitive impairments in depressive and anxiety disorders with 
 83  
 
a focus on young adults. Journal of Affective Disorders, 106(1-2), 1–27. 
doi:10.1016/j.jad.2007.06.006 
Cavallaro, R., Cavedini, P., Mistretta, P., Bassi, T., Angelone, S. M., Ubbiali, A., & 
Bellodi, L. (2003). Basal-corticofrontal circuits in schizophrenia and obsessive-
compulsive disorder: A controlled, double dissociation study. Biological Psychiatry, 
54(4), 437–443. doi: 10.1016/S0006-3223(02)01814-0 
Cavedini, P., Riboldi, G., D'Annucci, A., Belotti, P., Cisima, M., & Bellodi, L. (2002). 
Decision-making heterogeneity in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex function predicts different treatment outcomes. Neuropsychologia, 
40(2), 205–211. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(01)00077-X 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155–159. doi: 
10.1037/0033-2909.112.1.155 
Cohen, L. J., Hollander, E., DeCaria, C. M., Stein, D. J., Simeon, D., Liebowitz, M. R., & 
Aronowitz, B. R. (1996). Specificity of neuropsychological impairment in obsessive-
compulsive disorder: A comparison with social phobic and normal control subjects. 
The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 8(1), 82–85. 
Cunha, P. J., Bechara, A., de Andrade, A. G., & Nicastri, S. (2011). Decision-making 
deficits linked to real-life social dysfunction in crack cocaine-dependent individuals. 
The American Journal on Addictions, 20(1), 78–86. doi:10.1111/j.1521-
0391.2010.00097.x 
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New 
York: Putnum. 
 84  
 
Damasio, A.R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1990). Individuals with sociopathic behavior  
 
caused by frontal damage fail to respond autonomically to social stimuli. Behaviour  
 
Brain Research, 41(2), 81–94. doi: 10.1016/0166-4328(90)90144-4 
 
D'Zurilla, T. J., & Goldfried, M. R. (1971). Problem solving and behavior modification. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 78(1), 107. doi: 10.1037/h0031360 
Davey, G. (1994). Worrying, social problem-solving abilities, and social problem-solving 
confidence. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(3), 327-330. 
De Wilde, B., Verdejo-García, A., Sabbe, B., Hulstijn, W., & Dom, G. (2013). Affective 
decision-making is predictive of three-month relapse in polysubstance-dependent 
alcoholics. European Addiction Research, 19(1), 21–28. doi:10.1159/000339290 
Del Missier, F., Mäntylä, T., & Bruin, W. B. (2011). Decision-making competence, 
executive functioning, and general cognitive abilities. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 25(4), 331–351. doi:10.1002/bdm.731 
Di Nardo, P. A., Brown, T. A., & Barlow, D. H. (1994). Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule for DSM-IV. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Di Schiena, R., Luminet, O., Chang, B., & Philippot, P. (2013). Why are depressive 
individuals indecisive? Different modes of rumination account for indecision in non-
clinical depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 37, 713-724. 
doi:10.1007/s10608-012-9517-9 
Dunn, B. D., Dalgleish, T., & Lawrence, A. D. (2006). The somatic marker hypothesis: A 
critical evaluation. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 30(2), 239–271. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.07.001 
 85  
 
Edwards, W. (1961). Behavioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 12, 473–
498. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.12.020161.002353 
Ellis, H. C., & Ashbrook, P. W. (1989). The“ state” of mood and memory research: A 
selective review. Journal of Social Behavior & Personality, 4(2), 1-21.  
Eshel, N., & Roiser, J. P. (2010). Reward and punishment processing in depression. 
Biological Psychiatry, 68(2), 118–124. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.01.027 
Endrass, T., Kloft, L., Kaufmann, C., & Kathmann, N. (2010). Approach and avoidance 
learning obsessive-compulsive disorder. Depression and Anxiety, 28(2), 166-172. 
doi: 10.1002/da.20772 
Estrada, C. A., Isen, A. M., & Young, M. J. (1994). Positive affect improves creative 
problem solving and influences reported source of practice satisfaction in physicians. 
Motivation and Emotion, 18(4), 285-299. doi: 10.1007/BF02856470 
Fava, G. A., Savron, G., Rafanelli, C., Grandi, S., & Canestrari, R. (1996). Prodromal 
symptoms in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychopathology, 29(2), 131–134. 
Fein, G., McGillivray, S., & Finn, P. (2007). Older adults make less advantageous 
decisions than younger adults: Cognitive and psychological correlates. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 13(3), 480-489. doi: 
10/1017/S135561770707052X 
Fellows, L. K. (2006). Deciding how to decide: Ventromedial frontal lobe damage affects 
information acquisition in multi-attribute decision making. Brain, 129(4), 944–952. 
doi:10.1093/brain/awl017 
Ferrari, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2001). Behavioral information search by indecisives. 
 86  
 
Personality and Individual Differences, 30(7), 1113–1123. doi: 10.1016/S0191-
8869(00)00094-5 
Ferrari, J. R., & McCown, W. (1994). Procrastination tendencies among obsessive-
compulsives and their relatives. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 50(2), 162–167. 
Foa, E. B., Huppert, J. D., Leiberg, S., Langner, R., Kichic, R., Hajcak, G., & Salkovskis, 
P. M. (2002). The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory: Development and validation of 
a short version. Psychological Assessment, 14(4), 485–495. doi:10.1037//1040-
3590.14.4.485 
Foa, E. B., Mathews, A., Abramowitz, J. S., Amir, N., Przeworski, A., Riggs, D. S., et al. 
(2003). Do patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder have deficits in decision-
making? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(4), 431–445. 
doi:10.1023/A:1025424530644 
Forgas, J. P. (1991). Affective influences on partner choice: Role of mood in social 
decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(5), 708–720. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.61.5.708 
Fresco, D.M., Mennin, D.S., Heimberg, R.G., Turk, C.L. (2003). Using the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire to identify individuals with generalized anxiety disorder: A 
receiver operating characteristic analysis. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 34(3-4), 283-291. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2003.09.001 
Frost, R. O., & Shows, D. L. (1993). The nature and measurement of compulsive 
indecisiveness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(7), 683–692. doi:10.1016/0005-
7967(93)90121-A 
 87  
 
Frost, R. O., Tolin, D. F., Steketee, G., & Oh, M. (2011). Indecisiveness and hoarding. 
International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 4(3), 253–262. doi: 
10.1521/ijct.2011.4.3.253 
Gaff, I., Krausz, M., & Osipow, S. H. (1996). A taxonomy of difficulties in career 
decision-making. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 43(4), 510–526. 
Gansler, D.A., Jerram, M.W., Vannorsdall, T.D., & Schretien, D.J. (2011a). Comparing 
alternative metrics to assess performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 33(9), 1040-1048. doi: 
10.1080/13803395.2011.596820 
Gansler, D.A., Jerram, M.W., Vannorsdall, T.D., & Schretien, D.J. (2011b). Does the 
Iowa Gambling Task measure executive function? Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 26, 706-717. doi:10.1093/arclin/acr082 
Gayton, W. F., Clavin, R. H., Clavin, S. L., & Broida, J. (1994). Further validation of the 
Indecisiveness Scale. Psychological Reports, 75(3 Pt 2), 1631–1634. doi: 
10.2466/pr0.1994.75.3f.1631 
Gilbert, A.N., & Wysocki, C.J. (1992). Hand preference and age in the United States. 
Neuropsychologia, 30(7), 601-608.  
Goodwin, G. M. (1997). Neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence for the 
involvement of the frontal lobes in depression. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 
11(2), 115–122. doi: 10.1177/026988119701100204 
Grant, M. M., Thase, M. E., & Sweeney, J. A. (2001). Cognitive disturbance in outpatient 
depressed younger adults: Evidence of modest impairment. Biological Psychiatry, 
 88  
 
50(1), 35–43. doi: 10.1016/S0006-3223(00)01072-6 
Grant, S., Contoreggi, C., & London, E. D. (2000). Drug abusers show impaired 
performance in a laboratory test of decision making. Neuropsychologia, 38(8), 1180–
1187. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(99)00158-X 
Grisham, J.R., Brown, T.A., Savage, C.R., Steketee, G., & Barlow, D.H. (2007). 
Neuropsychological impairment associated with compulsive hoarding. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 45(7), 1471–1483. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2006.12.008 
Gualtieri, C. T., & Morgan, D. W. (2008). The frequency of cognitive impairment in 
patients with anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder: An unaccounted source of 
variance in clinical trials. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 69(7), 1122–1130. doi: 
10.4088/JCP.v69n0712 
Hafner, J., & Marks, I. (1976). Exposure in vivo of agoraphobics: contributions of 
diazepam, group exposure, and anxiety evocation. Psychological Medicine, 6(1), 71–
88. doi: 10.1017/S0033291700007510 
Hartlage, S., Alloy, L. B., Vázquez, C., & Dykman, B. (1993). Automatic and effortful 
processing in depression. Psychological Bulletin, 113(2), 247–278. doi: 
10.1037/0033-2909.113.2.247 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1979). Automatic and effortful processes in memory. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 108(3), 356. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.108.3.356 
Hastie, R. (2001). Problems for judgment and decision making. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 52(1), 653–683. 10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.653 
 89  
 
Hayes, A.F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical Mediation Analysis in the New 
Millenium. Communication Monographs, 76(4), 408-420. 
doi:10.1080/03637750903310360 
Hayes, S. C., Wilson, K. G., Gifford, E. V., Follette, V. M., & Strosahl, K. (1996). 
Experiential avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional approach 
to diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64(6), 
doi:10.1037/0022-006X.64.6.1152 
Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2008). The neural systems that 
mediate human perceptual decision making. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 9(6), 
467–479. doi:10.1038/nrn2374 
Heilman, R. M., Crişan, L. G., Houser, D., Miclea, M., & Miu, A. C. (2010). Emotion 
regulation and decision making under risk and uncertainty. Emotion, 10(2), 257–265. 
doi:10.1037/a0018489 
Hickie, I., Scott, E., Wilhelm, K., & Brodaty, H. (1997). Subcortical hyperintensities on 
magnetic resonance imaging in patients with severe depression: A longitudinal 
evaluation. Biological Psychiatry, 42(5), 367–374. doi:10.1016/S0006-
3223(96)00363-0 
Hinson, J. M., Jameson, T. L., & Whitney, P. (2002). Somatic markers, working memory, 
and decision making. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2(4), 341–
353. doi:10.3758/CABN.2.4.341 
Hock, M., Krohne, H. W., & Kaiser, J. (1996). Coping dispositions and the processing of 
ambiguous stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 1052-1066. 
 90  
 
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.1052 
Holland, J. L., & Holland, J. E. (1977). Vocational indecision: More evidence and 
speculation. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 24(5), 404-413. doi: 10.1037/0022-
0167.24.5.404 
Hu L., & Bentler P.M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling, 6(1), 1–55. doi: 10.1080/10705519909540118 
Huppert, J.D., Walther, M.R., Hajcak, G., Yadin, E., Foa, E.B., Simpson, H.B., & 
Liebowitz, M.R. (2007). The OCI-R: Validation of the subscales in a clinical sample. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21(3), 394-406. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.05.006 
Isen, A. M., & Means, B. (1983). The influence of positive affect on decision-making 
strategy. Social Cognition, 2(1), 18–31. 
Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision-making: A psychological analysis of conflict, 
choice, and commitment. New York: Free Press. 
Jollant, F., Bellivier, F., Leboyer, M., Astruc, B., Torres, S., Verdier, R., et al. (2005). 
Impaired decision-making in suicide attempters. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
162(2), 304–310. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.162.2.304 
Jollant, F., Guillaume, S., Jaussent, I., Bellivier, F., Leboyer, M., Castelnau, D., et al. 
(2007). Psychiatric diagnoses and personality traits associated with disadvantageous 
decision-making. European Psychiatry, 22(7), 455–461. 
doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2007.06.001 
Kaller, C.P., Rahm, B., Spreer, J., Weiller, C., & Unterrainer, J.M. (2011). Dissociable 
 91  
 
contributions of left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in planning. Cerebral 
Cortex, 21(2), 307-317. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhq096 
Kashyap, H., Kumar, J.K., Kandavel, T., & Reddy, Y.C.J. (2013). Neuropsychological 
functioning in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Are executive functions the key 
deficit? Comprehensive Psychiatry, 54(5), 533-540.  
Kim, M.-S., Park, S.-J., Shin, M. S., & Kwon, J. S. (2002). Neuropsychological profile in 
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder over a period of 4-month treatment. 
Journal of Psychiatric Research, 36(4), 257–265. doi: 10.1016/S0022-
3956(02)00017-1 
Kim, S. Y. H., Karlawish, J. H. T., & Caine, E. D. (2002). Current state of research on 
decision-making competence of cognitively impaired elderly persons. The American 
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 10(2), 151–165. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajgp.10.2.151 
Ladouceur, R., Blais, F., Freeston, M. H., & Dugas, M. J. (1998). Problem solving and 
problem orientation in generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
12(2), 139–152. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(98)00002-4 
Ladouceur, R., Talbot, F., & Dugas, M. J. (1997). Behavioral expressions of intolerance 
of uncertainty in worry. Behavior Modification, 21(3), 355–371. doi: 
10.1177/01454455970213006 
Lawrence, N. S., Wooderson, S., Mataix-Cols, D., David, R., Speckens, A., & Phillips, 
M. L. (2006). Decision-making and set shifting impairments are associated with 
distinct symptom dimensions in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Neuropsychology, 
20(4), 409–419. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.20.4.409 
 92  
 
Lee, D. (2013). Decision-making: From neuroscience to psychiatry. Neuron, 78(2), 233–
248. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.04.008 
Lejuez, C.W., Read, J.P., Kahler, C.W., Richards, J.B., Ramsey, S.E., Stuart, G.L.,  
Strong, D.R.,  . . . (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk-taking: The 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 
8(2), 75-84. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.8.2.75 
Lorian, C. N., & Grisham, J. R. (2011). Clinical implications of risk aversion: An online 
study of risk-avoidance and treatment utilization in pathological anxiety. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 25(6), 840–848. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.04.008 
Lorian, C. N., Titov, N., & Grisham, J. R. (2012). Changes in risk-taking over the course 
of an internet-delivered cognitive behavioral therapy treatment for generalized 
anxiety disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 26(1), 140–149. 
doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.10.003 
Lucas, J. A., Telch, M. J., & Bigler, E. D. (1991). Memory functioning in panic disorder: 
A neuropsychological perspective. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 5(1), 1-20. doi: 
10.1016/0887-6185(91)90013-J 
Luce, M. F., Bettman, J. R., & Payne, J. W. (1997). Choice processing in emotionally 
difficult decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 23(2), 384–405. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.23.2.384 
Mahurin, R. K., Velligan, D. I., Hazleton, B., Davis, J.M., Eckert, S., & Miller, A. L. 
(2006). Trail Making Test errors and executive function in schizophrenia and 
depression. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 20(2), 271–288. 
 93  
 
doi:10.1080/13854040590947498 
Malouff, J., Thorsteinsson, E., & Schutte, N. (2007). The efficacy of problem solving 
therapy in reducing mental and physical health problems: A meta-analysis. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 27(1), 46–57. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2005.12.005 
Maner, J. K., Richey, J. A., Cromer, K., Mallott, M., Lejuez, C. W., Joiner, T. E., & 
Schmidt, N. B. (2007). Dispositional anxiety and risk-avoidant decision-making. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 42(4), 665–675. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.016 
Mataix-Cols, D., Frost, R. O., Pertusa, A., Clark, L. A., Saxena, S., Leckman, J. F., . . . 
Wilhelm, S. (2010). Hoarding disorder: A new diagnosis for DSM-V? Depression 
and Anxiety, 27(6), 556–572. doi:10.1002/da.20693 
McDermott, L.M., & Ebmeier, K.P. (2009). A meta-analysis of depression severity and 
cognitive function. Journal of Affective Disorders, 119(1-3), 1-8. doi: 
10.1016/j.jad.2009.04.022 
Meehl, P. E. (1975). Hedonic capacity: Some conjectures. Bulletin of the Menninger 
Clinic, 39(4), 295-307.  
Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., & Cooke, A. D. (1998). Judgment and decision making. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 447–477. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.447 
Mendonca, J. D., & Siess, T. F. (1976). Counseling for indecisiveness: Problem-solving 
and anxiety-management training. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 23(4), 339–
346. doi: 10.1037/0022-0167.23.4.339 
Metzger, R. L., Miller, M. L., Cohen, M., Sofka, M., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Worry 
 94  
 
changes decision making: The effect of negative thoughts on cognitive processing. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46(1), 78–88. 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and 
validation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
28(6), 487–495. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(90)90135-6 
Milner, A. D., Beech, H. R., & Walker, V. J. (1971). Decision processes and obsessional 
behavior. The British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 10(1), 88–89. doi: 
10.1111/j.2044-8260.1971.tb00719.x 
Mitchell, A. J., McGlinchey, J. B., Young, D., Chelminski, I., & Zimmerman, M. (2008). 
Accuracy of specific symptoms in the diagnosis of major depressive disorder in 
psychiatric out-patients: Data from the MIDAS project. Psychological Medicine, 
39(7), 1107-1116. doi:10.1017/S0033291708004674 
Miu, A. C., Heilman, R. M., & Houser, D. (2008). Anxiety impairs decision-making: 
Psychophysiological evidence from an Iowa Gambling Task. Biological Psychology, 
77(3), 353–358. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2007.11.010 
Monterosso, J., Ehrman, R., Napier, K. L., & O'Brien, C. P. (2001). Three decision-
making tasks in cocaine-dependent patients: Do they measure the same construct? 
Addiction, 96(12), 1825-1837. doi: 10.1080/09652140120089571 
Moritz, S., Birkner, C., Kloss, M., Jahn, H., Hand, I., Haasen, C., & Krausz, M. (2002). 
Executive functioning in obsessive-compulsive disorder, unipolar depression, and 
schizophrenia. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 17(5), 477–483. doi: 
10.1016/S0887-6177(01)00130-5 
 95  
 
Mueller, E. M., Nguyen, J., Ray, W. J., & Borkovec, T. D. (2010). Future-oriented 
decision-making in generalized anxiety disorder is evident across different versions 
of the Iowa Gambling Task. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 41(2), 165–171. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2009.12.002 
Murphy, F. C., Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Rogers, R. D., Robbins, T. W., Paykel, E. 
S., & Sahakian, B. J. (2001). Decision-making cognition in mania and depression. 
Psychological Medicine, 31(4), 679–693. doi: 10.1017/S0033291701003804 
Must, A., Szabó, Z., Bódi, N., Szász, A., Janka, Z., & Kéri, S. (2006). Sensitivity to 
reward and punishment and the prefrontal cortex in major depression. Journal of 
Affective Disorders, 90(2-3), 209–215. doi:10.1016/j.jad.2005.12.005 
Muthén, L.K., & Muthén, B.O. (1998-2012). Mplus User's Guide. Seventh Edition. Los 
Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén.  
Naqvi, N., Shiv, B., & Bechara, A. (2006). The role of emotion in decision making: A 
cognitive neuroscience perspective. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
15(5), 260–264. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00448.x 
Nielen, M. M. A., Veltman, D. J., de Jong, R., Mulder, G., & den Boer, J. A. (2002). 
Decision making performance in obsessive compulsive disorder. Journal of Affective 
Disorders, 69(1-3), 257–260. doi: 10.1016/S0165-0327(00)00381-5 
Noël, X., Bechara, A., Dan, B., Hanak, C., & Verbanck, P. (2007). Response inhibition 
deficit is involved in poor decision making under risk in nonamnesic individuals with 
alcoholism. Neuropsychology, 21(6), 778–786. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.21.6.778 
Osipow, S. H. (1999). Assessing career indecision. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 
 96  
 
55(1), 147–154. doi: 10.1006/jvbe.1999.1704 
Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2005). Decision-making competence: External validation 
through an individual-differences approach. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
18(1), 1–27. doi:10.1002/bdm.481 
Patton, J.H., Stanford, M.S., & Barratt, E.S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 768-774. 
doi:10.1002/1097-4679(199511)51:6<768::AID- JCLP2270510607>3.0.CO;2-1 
Paulus, M. P. (2005). Neurobiology of decision-making: Quo vadis? Cognitive Brain 
Research, 23(1), 2–10. doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.01.001 
Paulus, M. P. (2007). Decision-making dysfunctions in psychiatry: Altered homeostatic 
processing? Science, 318(5850), 602–606. doi:10.1126/science.1142997 
Paulus, M. P., Feinstein, J. S., Simmons, A., & Stein, M. B. (2004). Anterior cingulate 
activation in high trait anxious subjects is related to altered error processing during 
decision making. Biological Psychiatry, 55(12), 1179–1187. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2004.02.023 
Paulus, M. P., & Yu, A. J. (2012). Emotion and decision-making: Affect-driven belief 
systems in anxiety and depression. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(9), 476–483. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.07.009 
Payne, J. W. (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: An 
information search and protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 16(2), 366-387. doi: 10.1016/0030-5073(76)90022-2 
Penadés, R., Catalán, R., Andrés, S., Salamero, M., & Gastó, C. (2005). Executive 
 97  
 
function and nonverbal memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry 
Research, 133(1), 81–90. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2004.09.005 
Pitz, G. F., & Sachs, N. J. (1984). Judgment and decision: Theory and application. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 35, 139–163. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.35.020184.001035 
Porter, R.J., Gallagher, P., Thompson, J.M., & Young, A.H. (2003). Neurocognitive 
impairment in drug-free patients with major depressive disorder. The British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 182, 214-220. doi: 10.1192/bjp.02.284 
Potworowski, G. A. (2010). Varieties of indecisive experience: Explaining the tendency 
to not make timely and stable decisions (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. 
Purcell, R., Maruff, P., Kyrios, M., & Pantelis, C. (1997). Neuropsychological function in 
young patients with unipolar major depression. Psychological Medicine, 27(6), 
1277–1285. doi: 10.1017/S0033291797005448 
Purcell, R., Maruff, P., Kyrios, M., & Pantelis, C. (1998). Neuropsychological deficits in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder: A comparison with unipolar depression, panic 
disorder, and normal controls. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55(5), 415–423. doi: 
10.1001/archpsyc.55.5.415 
Raghunathan, R., & Pham, M. T. (1999). All negative moods are not equal: Motivational 
influences of anxiety and sadness on decision making. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 79, 56–77. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1999.2838 
Rahman, S., Sahakian, B.J., Cardinal, R.N., Rogers, R.D., & Robbins, T.W. (2001). 
 98  
 
Decision making and neuropsychiatry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(6), 271–277. 
doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01650-8 
Rassin, E. (2007). A psychological theory of indecisiveness. Netherlands Journal of 
Psychology, 63(1), 1–11. doi:10.1007/BF03061056 
Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (2005). Indecisiveness and the interpretation of ambiguous 
situations. Personality and Individual Differences, 39(7), 1285–1291. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.06.006 
Rassin, E., Muris, P., Franken, I., Smit, M., & Wong, M. (2007). Measuring general 
indecisiveness. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 29(1), 60–
67. doi:10.1007/s10862-006-9023-z 
Reed, G. F. (1976). Indecisiveness in obsessional-compulsive disorder. British Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology, 15(4), 443-445. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
8260.1976.tb00059.x 
Reitan, R. M., & Wolfson, D. (1985). The Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test  
Battery: Theory and clinical interpretation. Tucson, AZ: Neuropsychology Press. 
Reitan, R.M., & Wolfson, D. (1993). Category Test and Trail Making Test as measures 
of frontal lobe functions. Clinical Neuropsychologist, 9(1), 50-56. doi: 
10.1080/13854049508402057 
Rilling, J. K., & Sanfey, A. G. (2011). The neuroscience of social decision-making. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 62(1), 23–48. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131647 
Rogers, R. D., Owen, A. M., Middleton, H. C., Williams, E. J., Pickard, J. D., Sahakian, 
 99  
 
B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (1999). Choosing between small, likely rewards and large, 
unlikely rewards activates inferior and orbital prefrontal cortex. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 19(20), 9029–9038. 
Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Underwood, B. R., Tempest, M., & Sahakian, B. J. 
(2006). Impaired cognition and decision-making in bipolar depression but no 
“affective bias” evident. Psychological Medicine, 36(5), 629–639. 
doi:10.1017/S0033291705006689 
Sachdev, P. S., & Malhi, G. S. (2005). Obsessive–compulsive behaviour: A disorder of 
decision-making. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 39(9), 757–
763. 
Salthouse, T.A. (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in 
cognition. Psychological Review, 103(3), 403-428. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.103.3.403 
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The 
neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 
300(5626), 1755–1758. doi:10.1126/science.1082976 
Savickas, M. L. (1995). Constructivist counseling for career indecision. The Career 
Development Quarterly, 43(4), 363-373.  
Schall, U., Johnston, P., Lagopoulos, J., Jüptner, M., Jentzen, W., Thienel, R., . . . Ward, 
P.B. (2003). Functional brain maps of Tower of London performance: A PET and 
fMRI study. NeuroImage, 20, 1154-1161. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00338-0 
Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philosophical Transactions of the 
 100  
 
Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences, 298(1089), 199–209. 
Smoski, M. J., Lynch, T. R., Rosenthal, M. Z., Cheavens, J. S., Chapman, A. L., & 
Krishnan, R. R. (2008). Decision-making and risk aversion among depressive adults. 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 39(4), 567–576. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2008.01.004 
Sobin, C., & Sackeim, H. A. (1997). Psychomotor symptoms of depression. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 154(1), 4–17. 
Starcke, K., Tuschen-Caffier, B., Markowitsch, H. J., & Brand, M. (2010). Dissociation 
of decisions in ambiguous and risky situations in obsessive–compulsive disorder. 
Psychiatry Research, 175(1-2), 114–120. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2008.10.022 
Steinberg, L., Sharp, C., Stanford, M.S., & Tharp, A.T. (2013). New tricks for an old 
measure: The development of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale--Brief (BIS-Brief).  
 Psychological Assessment, 25(1), 216-226. doi: 10.1037/a0030550 
Steingrover, H., Wezels, R., Horstmann, A., Neumann, J., Wagemakers, E.-J. (2013). 
Performance of healthy participants on the Iowa Gambling Task. Psychological 
Assessment, 25, 180-193. doi: 10.1037/a0029929 
Steketee, G., Frost, R.O., & Kyrios, M. (2003). Cognitive aspects of compulsive 
hoarding. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(4), 463-479. 
10.1023/A:1025428631552 
Stuss, D.T., Bisschop, S.M., Alexander, M.P., Levine, B., Katz, D., & Izukawa, D. 
(2001). The Trail Making Test: A study in focal lesion patients. Psychological 
Assessment, 13(2), 230-239.  
 101  
 
Tallis, F., & Eysenck, M. W. (1994). Worry: Mechanisms and modulating influences. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 22(1), 37-56. doi: 
10.1017/S1352465800011796 
Tarbuck, A. F., & Paykel, E. S. (1995). Effects of major depression on the cognitive 
function of younger and older subjects. Psychological Medicine, 25(2), 285–295. doi: 
10.1017/S0033291700036187 
Taylor, K. M., & Betz, N. E. (1983). Applications of self-efficacy theory to the 
understanding and treatment of career indecision. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 
22(1), 63-81. doi: 10.1016/0001-8791(83)90006-4 
Toplak, M. E., Sorge, G. B., Benoit, A., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2010). 
Decision-making and cognitive abilities: A review of associations between Iowa 
Gambling Task performance, executive functions, and intelligence. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 30(5), 562–581. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.04.002 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of 
choice. Science, 211(4481), 453-458. doi: 10.1126/science.7455683 
van Randenborgh, A., de Jong-Meyer, R., & Hüffmeier, J. (2009). Rumination fosters 
indecision in dysphoria. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 66(3), 229-243. 
doi:10.1002/jclp.20647 
van Randenborgh, A., de Jong-Meyer, R., & Hüffmeier, J. (2010). Decision-making in 
depression: Differences in decisional conflict between healthy and depressed 
 102  
 
individuals. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 17(14), 285–298. 
doi:10.1002/cpp.651 
Verdejo-García, A., Benbrook, A., Funderburk, F., David, P., Cadet, J.-L., & Bolla, K. I. 
(2007). The differential relationship between cocaine use and marijuana use on 
decision-making performance over repeat testing with the Iowa Gambling Task. 
Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 90(1), 2–11. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2007.02.004 
Wechsler, D. (1997). WAIS-III, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. San Antonio, TX: 
Psychological Corporation.  
Young, J. E., Weinberger, A. D., & Beck, A. T. (2001). Cognitive therapy for depression. 
In D. H. Barlow (Ed.), Clinical Handbook of Psychological Disorders (3rd ed.). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Zakanis, K.K., Mraz, R., & Graham, S.J. (2005). An fMRI study of the Trail Making 
Test. Neuropsychologia, 43(13), 1878-86. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.03.013 
Zimmerman, M., Chelminski, I., McGlinchey, J. B., & Young, D. (2006). Diagnosing 
major depressive disorder X: Can the utility of the DSM-IV symptom criteria be 
improved? The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 194(12), 893–897. 
doi:10.1097/01.nmd.0000248970.50265.34 
  
 103  
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 104  
 
 
  
 
 105  
 
 
 106  
 
 107  
 
 108  
 
 109  
 
